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Abstract
After several years of planning, Mayor Thomas Menino, the Boston Redevelopment Authority
(BRA), and the Boston Real Estate Development community are poised to begin the build-out of
the South Boston Seaport district. This area is considered by some, the most desirable urban
property in the country, with estimates of 20 million square feet of buildings and nearly 44,000
new jobs to be created in the next 30 years. The only thing standing in their way is the
politically powerful South Boston community. The people of South Boston are not necessarily
against the development of the Seaport, but after almost 200 years of feeling abused by the
business interests in Boston, they are going to exact a high price, and it will come in the form of
linkage.
On March 11, 1998, the BRA signed a Memorandum of Understanding with three South Boston
leaders, paving the way for City Council approval of a new Convention Center in the South
Boston Seaport. By taking advantage of good timing and influential leaders, the South Boston
community managed to wrestle away at least half of the linkage money from the Seaport into the
newly formed South Boston Betterment Trust. In addition, the South Boston community gained
significant control over building heights in the Seaport, which will have a lasting impact on the
aesthetic and economic future of the City.
This thesis will review the 16 year history of Real Estate development linkage in Boston,
particularly the way it has been leveraged to create affordable housing, in order to learn what is
legal, what is appropriate, and what is currently happening with the linkage program in Boston.
I will focus most of my attention on the Neighborhood Housing Trust (NHT) as the current
vehicle for awarding linkage payments to the neighborhoods, and evaluate the impact of the new
South Boston Betterment Trust (SBBT) on the planning process. I will conclude with
recommendations for how the City and the South Boston Community can best utilize these
Trusts to move the planning process forward in the South Boston Seaport District. With over
$66 million in linkage expected from the Seaport development over the next three decades, it
will be imperative for the South Boston community and the City that linkage money be spent
wisely, to provide affordable housing for its citizens, and ensure the future of the linkage
program for the City of Boston.
Thesis Supervisor: Langley Keyes, Professor of Urban Planning
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In November of 1983, a City Councilor named Ray Flynn won Boston's mayoral race, becoming
the first South Boston politician to win Boston's highest office. Flynn was a populist leader who
understood the need to spread the wealth from the increasingly successful downtown into the
neighborhoods that were struggling with rapidly increasing rents and deteriorating housing stock.
His method for transferring the wealth was a novel idea borrowed from San Francisco called
linkage, whereby developers seeking zoning approvals for a building project would be required
to make contributions to the City for affordable housing and job training programs.
Sixteen years later, another City Councilor from South Boston is proposing changes to the
linkage program that will have profound effects on the future of affordable housing in Boston.
In a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed on March 11, 1998, City Council President
James Kelly traded his vote for a new convention center in the South Boston Seaport in exchange
for the majority of all future Seaport linkage money deposited into a new "South Boston
Betterment Trust". This MOU would change linkage procedures that have been in place for over
a decade and could have potential negative impacts on a program that has helped provide the
Boston housing market with over 4,800 housing units, most of those affordable. This agreement
comes in the middle of a contentious debate between the Boston Redevelopment Authority
(BRA) and South Boston leaders over how much housing is appropriate in the new Seaport
district. The BRA would like to see up to 8,000 housing units to make this area a lively place to
visit and in which to live.' South Boston politicians have not welcomed the proposed growth in
housing stock, feeling threatened by the potential influx of new residents not sharing the ideals of
the traditional neighborhood.
1 Boston Redevelopment Authority. The Seaport Public Realm Plan. February 1999. P. 5.
The demands being made by South Boston are part of a growing trend in Boston where local
communities are using linkage as a negotiating tool to shift the balance of power from the
traditional business interests back to the neighborhoods. This is done by threatening to stop
development unless an appropriate number of concessions are made to the right community
organizations. The problem with this new type of political leveraging is that it is no longer clear
what the rules are, and the purpose of linkage (building affordable housing due to pressures from
commercial development) seems lost in the shuffle. Another serious problem with this new
trend is that not all neighborhoods have the political strength and the good fortune to use linkage
in this way.
The South Boston Seaport is the best current example of this new method of negotiating with
linkage. After several years of planning, Mayor Menino, the BRA, and the real estate
development community are poised to begin the build-out of the Seaport, with estimates of 20
million square feet of buildings and nearly 44,000 new jobs coming on line in the next three
decades. The only thing standing in their way is the politically powerful South Boston
community.
Seaport Context
The South Boston Seaport district has been called the best development opportunity in the
country due to its prime location adjacent to Boston's Central Business District with direct
connections to Logan Airport. In addition, a new interstate highway and public transit system
will bisect hundreds of acres of developable land. The Seaport is bounded by the Fort Point
Channel on the west, the harbor and Logan Airport to the north, the deep water port to the east,
and the South Boston neighborhood to the south (Figure 1-1).
Much of the recent interest in the Seaport has been a result of over $20 billion in public
infrastructure investment in the area, including the Central Artery/Third Harbor Tunnel project,
the Silver Line transit system, and the cleaner Boston Harbor as a result of the Massachusetts
Water Resource Authority Sewage treatment plant at Deer Island. In addition, a new Federal
Courthouse on Fan Pier and the proposed Convention and Exhibition Center at Summer and D
Street are paving the way for many new development opportunities.
North
Figure 1-1: South Boston Seaport Context Maps
Base Map Source: MassGIS and MIT
Seaport History
The land north of West First Street and East First Street was originally a tidal marsh adjacent to
the peninsula called Dorchester Neck, where residents of Dorchester grazed their cattle and later
built large family estates. In 1804, the peninsula was annexed to Boston and the name was
changed to South Boston. At the same time, State legislation was passed to allow landfill to
create new sites for commercial development as well as a toll bridge connecting the peninsula to
Boston and extending the street grid of the South End across Dorchester Neck, with Broadway
being the primary artery.
Industrial activity started locating in South Boston around 1810, with the South Boston Iron
Company, a glassworks company, and the Wheelright Shipyards leading the way. Brick making
companies also started locating kilns on the peninsula around this time. Large numbers of
people began moving to South Boston starting in 1828, with the opening of the North Free
Bridge, the first free transportation route to the peninsula. Sixty families lived in South Boston
at the time of annexation in 1804. By 1830, the population had grown to 2,200 people, and by
1850, the population of South Boston was 13,000. The introduction of the street railway system
and the industrial expansion from the Civil War caused the population to triple between 1850
and 1870, to over 39,000 people.2
South Boston continued to increase its industrial base until it ran out of room to grow. In 1833,
75 acres of mud flats were filled in for a new railroad terminus, and speculators started thinking
about the potential for creating new land out of swamp. In response to the speculation, the
Boston Harbor Commission set limits on development by legally defining how far wharves could
be extended into the harbor. In 1836, the newly-formed Boston Wharf Company obtained rights
to the mud flats and began building wharves out to the extent of the legal limits. The land along
the Fort Point Channel was completely filled in by the 1880's, with some of the fill coming from
the debris of the great fire of 1872 (Figure 1-2).3 As the Boston Wharf Company started building
sheds for storing imported sugar and molasses, they switched from wharfage to real-estate
2 Boston Redevelopment Authority. The Seaport Public Realm Plan. Boston, MA. February 1999. P. 9.
' Boston Public Library. Fort Point Channel Exhibit. October 1997.
development and quickly became the most influential developer of the Fort Point Channel. In
the 1850s, they invited the railroads to the area, creating a vital sea to railroad link.
After filling in the mud flats in 1882, the Boston Wharf Company decided to take advantage of
the booming sea trade and build wharves on the new South Boston waterfront. They began an
ambitious construction project with architect M.D. Safford, resulting in the creation of the Fort
Point Channel District.4 These brick and granite warehouses and factory buildings built around
the axes of Summer, Congress and A Streets gave this area a rich architectural fabric that is still
in existence today.
By the 1920's, the South Boston waterfront, including the Fort Point Channel, was one of the
busiest in the country. In 1900, it employed 50% of Boston's industrial workers.5 During this
time, the Channel was a major warehousing and distribution center for the City's wool and ice
industries. The American Sugar Refining Company was a prominent anchor at the bend of the
upper Channel, creating warehousing and distribution for sugar and molasses. Lumber, coal,
bananas and leather were other commodities commonly stored and distributed through the
Channel.
The Channel's rail and shipping facilities encouraged the development of manufacturing,
producing such goods as iron, glass, brick, machinery, wagons, soap, elevators and beer.6 The
most successful of these manufacturing enterprises was the Gillette Safety Razor Company,
which today remains the last remnant of the industrial glory days of the Channel.7
The South Boston Seaport remained an important piece of the Boston industrial economy into
the 1930's. After World War One, however, the physical traits that made the port, specifically
the Fort Point Channel, a special place became a liability. The large ocean-going ships could no
longer sail into the narrow Channel, and smaller ships that could sail into the Channel preferred
4 Southworth, Susan and Michael, AIA Guide to Boston, 1992.
5 City of Boston, "Fort Point District Plan Progress Report", March 1989.
6 Greater Boston Chamber of Commerce, "Fort Point Channel Project Report", July 1988.
7 Boston Public Library. Fort Point Channel Exhibit. October 1997.
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Kennedy, Lawrence W. Planning the City Upon A Hill.




Figure 1-4: South Boston Seaport District, 1997-1999
Source: Photos are from the South Boston Seaport Web Site
Created by Michael A. Fischer and T. Luke Young
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not to negotiate the narrow bridge openings. Much of the port's decline was part of the general
decline of Boston as an industrial center. An absence of an adequate seaport truck route system
hurt the area as railroads were being replaced by trucks on the newly constructed U.S. highway
system. Changes in intercontinental transportation patterns, new containerized shipping
technologies, and the departure of the textile industry from New England, all led to sharp
declines in the use of the Port in general and Fort Point Channel specifically.8 Warehouses, piers
and rail yards were razed and replaced with vast acres of parking lots. The deepest point in the
Port's decline came in the 1970's when the Federal Government decided to close Boston's Navy
Yards at Charlestown and South Boston (currently the Marine Industrial Park of South Boston).
In summary, the forces behind the early growth and success of the South Boston Seaport
included progressive Government policy, a strong real estate market and investment in the
transportation infrastructure. The forces behind the decline of the Seaport included outside
market pressures such as industries shifting to other geographic locations, and slow reactions to
the changes in transportation technologies. As we
approach the year 2000, the same forces are ironically
reshaping the future of the Seaport. A strong real estate
market is causing the expansion of the Central Business
District across the Fort Point Channel into the Seaport,
partly caused by the investment in transportation
infrastructure (Figure 1-5). At the same time, Boston is
making its next transition from an industrial economy to a
service economy, causing much discussion about the future
of the Seaport with the residents of South Boston, often
referred to as "Southies", who have historically depended
on the industrial waterfront for their livelihood.
Figure 1-5: Central Artery
Construction in the Seaport
8 City of Boston, "Fort Point District Plan Progress Report", March 1989.
_~ ____ _ __ __ _ _~L~Y~
Political Context
Despite the fact that the Seaport today does not employ as many South Boston residents as it did
in the early 1900's, Southies in the 1990's still consider the area their "back yard", and have
repeatedly defeated proposals for public facilities such as baseball stadiums and football
stadiums which would bring little financial benefit to their community.
All of that changed on March 11, 1998, when South Boston leaders approved a convention
center to be located in the middle of the Seaport district (see Figure 1-6). The timing could not
have been better for the residents of South Boston. In 1997, the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts passed a resolution in the Senate and House of Representatives approving a $600
million convention center project in the South Boston Seaport, provided the City of Boston give
its approval by a certain date. That date was March 11, 1998, and Council President James
Kelly knew it. He also knew how much Mayor Tom Menino wanted the Convention Center as
the legacy of his administration. Kelly, a South Boston native, controlled enough votes on the
City Council to delay the proceedings unless the City agreed to specific terms that were
important to the South Boston Community.9 At the last hour, a "Memorandum of
Understanding" was signed between the BRA and the leaders from South Boston.
Among the terms promised as part of the memorandum were:
* No less than the majority of job linkage from the Seaport will be allocated to the South
Boston neighborhood.
* No less than the majority of housing linkage from the Seaport will be allocated to the South
Boston neighborhood
* Within 180 days, the BRA shall identify parcels of land available in South Boston for the
development of affordable single and multi-family housing.
* The BRA shall use its best efforts to encourage developers to purchase available sites in
South Boston on behalf of the South Boston Betterment Trust.
* The BRA shall petition the Boston Zoning Commission to establish in the Seaport District a
maximum as-of-right building height of 150 feet. If developers want to exceed 150 feet, they
will have to complete a community review process and execute a written agreement
obligating them to pay certain benefits to the neighborhood in addition to the base linkage
payments.
9 Babson, Jennifer. Boston Globe. March 5, 1998.
Figure 1-6: Boston Convention and Exhibition Center Site Plan
Source: City of Boston. Boson Convention and Exhibition Center Final Report. March 1997.
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By taking advantage of good timing and
influential leaders, the South Boston
community managed to wrestle away at
least half of the linkage money from the
Seaport and significant control over
building heights, which will have a long-
term impact on the aesthetic and economic
future of the City. Throughout the process,
the question that has not been asked is,
"why is the Seaport being linked to South
Boston?" If the argument is about being
the closest, Chinatown, East Boston and
Figure 1-7: 1.5 Mile Radius From Fan Pier the South End should also be part of the
discussion (Figure 1-7). It is
approximately 1.5 miles from the new Federal Courthouse on Fan Pier to Telegraph Hill, the
geographic center of South Boston. In comparison, it is .9 miles from the Federal Courthouse to
the Boston Common, 1.1 miles to Maverick Square in East Boston, .8 miles to the heart of
Chinatown, and only one mile to Beacon Hill. Despite the weak proximity argument, Fan Pier is
considered part of South Boston's claimed territory. If the argument is escalation of housing
prices, then South Boston falls short since both the East Boston and South End neighborhoods
have seen house prices increase faster over the last four years than has South Boston (Table 1-1).
This is not about proximity or housing prices. It is about which neighborhood has the political
leverage, which South Boston clearly has. It is unclear when they first lay claim to the Seaport,
but South Boston's right to it today is now an undisputed fact.
The political strength of South Boston regarding the Seaport can be attributed to good timing and
strong leadership, but the most important factor is that the citizens of South Boston have earned
it through their long history of active participation in the voting process. As simple as it seems,
the fact that they actually go out and vote gives them an increased amount of leverage with any
elected official that relies on citywide votes to get elected. Lou DiNatale, a senior fellow at the
McCormack Institute for Public Affairs at UMass Boston, confirmed that the "disproportionate
input South Boston has because of its large voter turnout makes it the literal linchpin in all of city
decision-making."'o
South Boston is the last neighborhood in the City that still votes as a block, which is why they
currently have two City Council members, one State Representative, one State Senator and a
U.S. Congressman, all from within the South Boston neighborhood. The greatest fear of both the
South Boston community and its elected leaders seems to be that the neighborhood might
change. People that are different might move in and upset the delicate balance that has existed
here for over a century. The residents of South Boston are probably correct in fearing that they
will lose political influence once enough newcomers move into the neighborhood. These
newcomers might not appreciate or want to accept the "Southie" way of doing business.
Single Fam. Two Fam. Three Fam. Condos Overall
94-98 94-98 94-98 94-98 94-98
Boston Neighborhood %Change %Change % Change % Change % Change
South End 145% 82% 123% 58% 102.0%
Charlestown 85% 115% 121% 29% 87.5%
Roxbury 72% 69% 94% 66% 75.3%
Hyde Park 25% 32% 31% 175% 65.8%
East Boston 23% 69% 105% 62% 64.8%
South Boston 46% 66% 94% 48% 63.5%
Allston/Brighton 42% 61% 73% 62% 59.5%
Dorchester 40% 44% 103% 46% 58.3%
Jamaica Plain 21% 64% 111% 25% 55.3%
Mattapan 34% 55% 125% -6% 52.0%
Citywide 32% 38% 82% 36% 47.0%
Roslindale 36% 37% 36% 74% 45.8%
Fenway/Kenmore 35% NA -31% 63%
West Roxbury 27% 35% NA 49%
Central 92% NA NA 39%
Back Bay/Beacon Hill NA NA NA 12%
Table 1-1: Residential Sales Price Increases in Boston from 1994-1998
Source: City of Boston Department of Neighborhood Development. Draft Report at March 4, 1999 NHT meeting.
Data Source: Banker and Tradesman.
0o Beman, Ben. The Boston Phoenix. May 6-13, 1999.
A good example of this type of newcomer would be the members of "Seaport Alliance for a
Neighborhood Design" (SAND). This is a group made up of residents, business owners, artists,
architects, urban planners, cultural institutions and community groups that are located in or have
a connection to the Fort Point Channel. These members of the Fort Point Channel community
have technically been a part of the South Boston "claimed territory", but never part of its inner
circle, because these are the newcomers that do not share the common bonds that unite the
traditional South Boston community. In fact, it has only been in the past couple of years that a
Fort Point Channel representative has been offered a seat on the powerful South Boston
Leadership Committee."
The charter of SAND claims that they want to be a collective voice of the community in the
South Boston Seaport development process. They have a web site designed to inform the
community of any meetings taking place as well as any late breaking news on the planning
process. The new development pressures in the South Boston Seaport district are starting to
illuminate the differences between the traditional South Boston neighborhood and the
newcomers in the Fort Point Channel area. In 1991, U.S. Congressman Joe Moakley convinced
his colleagues in Washington, D.C. to locate the new Federal Courthouse on Fan Pier,
conveniently located on the property of his good friend, Anthony Athanas, who netted $32
million in the deal.' 2 Despite the fact that Moakley was renting a summer cottage from Athanas
and had other business dealings with him, the traditional South Boston neighborhood saw
nothing wrong. After all, they had grown up with ethnic politics as a way of life (see Chapter
Two: South Boston). The fact that Joe Moakley was offering this generous "constituent service"
to his good friend was completely acceptable, especially since it did not have any obvious
negative affects on the neighborhood and he negotiated some new public transit to Fan Pier as
part of the process. 13 The Fort Point Channel neighborhood felt much more threatened by the
process, perhaps because of their proximity to the site. They were openly critical of Moakley
and the fact that the community was not consulted about the deal.
" The South Boston Leadership Committee consists of the elected officials in South Boston and the community
members they select.
12 Golden, Daniel. Boston Globe. September 29, 1991.
13 Vennochi, Joan and Ackerman, Jerry. Boston Globe. June 16, 1991.
The South Boston Seaport Planning process will undoubtedly be the source of the liveliest debate
between the traditional neighborhood and the Fort Point Channel neighborhood. The traditional
community appears to be focused on what it can prevent from happening, instead of providing
meaningful input to the planning process. Even after begrudgingly agreeing that some
development will have to occur in south Boston, the traditional community is focused on how it
will use the linkage money to ensure the neighborhood does not change. James Kelly summed
up the neighborhood opinion well in the April 19, 1998 Boston Globe article:
"We're not going to use that money to clean the streets. We're not going to use
that money to build parks. We pay taxes to the city so the city maintains the
streets and cleans the parks. We're going to use as much money as we can to
make sure that residents of South Boston are not driven out of the neighborhood."
The article noted that Kelly wanted to use the linkage funds to keep the enclave just the way it is,
by building affordable housing for those born and bred in South Boston and by improving
education, particularly in the area's parochial schools. In Kelly's view, all of the new
development should be in the manufacturing sector which would offer high-paying jobs for the
South Boston work force. Linkage money should be used to provide low-cost housing for those
same workers. 14
Meanwhile, SAND is promoting the idea of thousands of units of new housing being built in
South Boston. They agree with the urban design experts that the only way to achieve a vibrant
urban fabric for the area is to create a "24-hour" city, and the only way to achieve a "24-hour"
city is to fill it with housing of varying income levels.' 5 Obviously, thousands of new housing
units are going to provide housing for more than just traditional South Boston residents, and that
is where the conflict will arise.
The Seaport Planning Context
The words "planning" and "Seaport district" were rarely used in the same sentence prior to
Boston's economic expansion of the 1980's. For several decades, Fan Pier, the most desirable
real estate in the Seaport, was used as a parking lot by financial district employees and workers
14 Cassidy, Tina. Boston Globe. April 19, 1998.
from nearby factories. The image of the Seaport as a parking lot was shattered in January of
1986 when the Pritzker family of Chicago and local businessman Anthony Athanas teamed up to
propose a $1 billion development on Fan Pier and Pier Four. Athanas had purchased most of the
land on Fan Pier in 1969 and was waiting for the right opportunity. That opportunity came with
the growth of Boston's financial district in the early 1980's, moving Boston's center of gravity
closer to the South Boston Seaport. 16 The plan to transform the 18.5 acre piece of land into four
office buildings, an 800-room hotel, three apartment buildings, an art museum and a marina
aroused immediate opposition from groups such as South Boston residents, the Boston Shippers
Association, Fort Point Arts Community, Massachusetts Audubon Society, League of Women
Voters, and the Conservation Law Foundation. Most of the opposition was focused on
"downtown-like densities" and building heights that reached 520 feet. 17
Despite community opposition, the Boston Redevelopment Authority (BRA) approved the Fan
Pier and Pier Four plans on April 23, 1987, with minor modifications in building heights to be
negotiated with the BRA.' 8 In response to the community pressure, the BRA commissioned
David Dixon and Associates to prepare a set of urban design guidelines for the New Congress
Street/Piers Enterprize Zone which encompassed the Fan Pier area. The New Congress
Street/Piers Urban Design Guidelines plan was issued in March of 1989 outlining guidelines for
public open space, public streets, land use and density, street-level activities, massing, scale,
height and architectural character (Figure 1-8). The study discouraged a "downtown" quality for
the district, suggesting 65 foot height limits along the waterfront, and 300 foot limits for
buildings south of the World Trade Center. Within months of its completion, the Dixon study
was put on the shelf as the Pritzker/Athanas relationship ended in a bitter court battle while
Boston's real estate market started falling apart.
Planning and development discussions were nonexistent in the Seaport between 1989 and 1995
as Boston's real estate market went through a depression and a new Mayor took office. The only
15 The term "24-hour" city refers to mixed land uses that promote activity in the neighborhood 24 hours a day.
16 King, John. Boston Globe. November 12, 1989.
17 New York Times. February 15, 1987.
18 King, John. Boston Globe. April 22, 1989.
exception was in 1991, when Congressman Joe Moakley convinced his colleagues in
Washington, D.C. to locate a new Federal Courthouse on Fan Pier.19
Figure 1-8: Axonometric View of Proposed District From 1989 Dixon Plan
Source: BRA. New Congress Street/Piers Urban Design Guidelines: Building a New District
In 1995, developer Frank McCourt, the owner of 20 acres of prime real estate just south of Fan
Pier, hired architect Howard Elkis to create his own version of the "public realm" plan for the
Seaport. McCourt had owned his property in the Seaport since the early 1970's, and found the
four-year cycles of Mayors and Governors were more conducive to producing proposals for
conventions centers and football stadiums than long-range visions.20 McCourt felt that the 1989
Dixon plan was doomed to fail because it lacked vision and its supporters were not part of Mayor
'9 Golden, Daniel. Boston Globe. September 29, 1991.
20 McCourt, Frank. Developer. Interview. November 1997.
Menino's new Administration. 21 His solution was to have the private sector take the lead and
create a vision for the public realm of the Seaport district.
In early 1996, as McCourt and other Seaport advocates pressed for a city-wide planning process
for the Seaport, Mayor Menino put together a team of 21 people to form the South Boston
Waterfront Committee (SBWC). The goal of the committee was to look at the redevelopment of
the Boston Marine Industrial Park, located on the site of the former U.S. Army base land. After
advising the Mayor to abandon plans for redeveloping the industrial park, the committee
continued to meet discussing issues affecting the waterfront. 22 In the Spring of 1997, the
committee started meeting weekly with the BRA discussing the need for a master plan for the
South Boston Seaport. The SBWC continued to meet with the BRA providing input until The
South Boston Seaport Master Plan interim report was unveiled by Mayor Menino in November
of 1997.
The forty-page interim report was really a framework for an anticipated future plan, with very
little information regarding a future vision for the Seaport. In fact, the Streetscape plan was
almost identical to Frank McCourt's public realm plan from two years earlier (Figure 1-9). The
most controversial part of the plan was around the issue of building heights (Figure 1-10). The
plan proposed allowable heights of up to 250 feet on parts of Fan Pier with some parcels
negotiable up to 350 feet. Harbor advocates such as the Conservation Law Foundation criticized
what they considered excessive building heights, suggesting that they did not meet Chapter 91
restrictions.23
Within days of the interim report being released to the public, the Pritzker family re-surfaced
with a new partner, Mortimer Zuckerman's Boston Properties, proposing a revised plan for Fan
Pier. The mixed-use proposal was officially submitted to the BRA on December 17, 1997 and
included an 800-room hotel, luxury condos and office towers with building heights up to 295
feet. 24 The proposal was panned by South Boston residents, community groups and harbor
21 Ibid.
22 Silberberg, Susan. South Boston: Planning in a Reluctant Community. MIT Thesis. 1998.
3 Chapter 91 is a Massachusetts state law restricting development on waterfront land.
24 Meyers, Jack. Boston Herald. December 17, 1997.
Figure 1-9: Interim Plan Streetscape
Source: Boston Redevelopment Authority.
The South Boston Seaport Interim Plan. November 1997
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Figure 1-10: Interim Plan Building Heights
Source: Boston Redevelopment Authority.
The South Boston Seaport Interim Plan. November 1997.
--
advocates, since the proposed building heights exceeded state regulations and the new Seaport
Master Plan guidelines. 25
If the intent of the interim plan was to stir up interest in the Seaport planning process, it should
be considered quite successful. Groups such as the Boston Society of Architects (BSA), the
Seaport Alliance for a Neighborhood Design (SAND), Boston Harbor Association, and the
Conservation Law Foundation (CLF) all started weighing in with opinions on the Seaport design.
The CLF focused on general planning issues, particularly transportation, and sought urban design
experts for their opinions.26 The Boston Harbor Association focused on maintaining a viable
working harbor, while SAND and the BSA developed urban design proposals complete with
drawings and guidelines. A common theme was a call for more housing and lower building
heights. As an example, the BSA proposal called for 10,000 housing units and the creation of a
"development rights marketplace" allowing developers along the waterfront to sell their
development rights to other developers for sites where building higher would not have such a
negative impact on the public realm (Figure 1-11). 2 7
Figure 1-11: BSA Illustrative Plan for the Seaport District
Source: Boston Society of Architects. A Shared Vision For the Seaport. June 25, 1998.
25 Ibid.
26 Russell, Robert H. Conservation Matters. Spring 1998. P. 9.
27 Boston Society of Architects. A Shared Vision for the Seaport. June 25, 1998.
In addition, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and the Boston Globe sponsored
the "Boston Harbor Conference" in April of 1998, bringing together a panel of experts to listen
to testimony and make recommendations for the future of the Boston harbor. As part of the
research for the conference, an MIT urban planning studio also created an urban design vision
for the South Boston Seaport, stressing lower building heights on Fan Pier and maximizing
opportunities for housing throughout the Seaport district (Figure 1-12).
In March 1998, it became clear to the Fan Pier developers that the community dialogue would
prevent any decisions from being made about their proposal, so they declared a "timeout" and
the partnership dissolved. 28 In August 1998, the Pritzker family formed a new partnership with
Boston based developer Spaulding & Slye. Project Manager Daniel O'Connell suggested that
the development team would not make another proposal until the City issued its final master
plan. O'Connell hoped the BRA would release the master plan by the Fall, but "was not going
to waste any time waiting for that", as he immediately went to work meeting with the South
Boston community leaders. 29
In February 1999, after 15 months of city-wide participation, the Seaport Public Realm Plan was
released to the public. The five primary objectives of the plan were:
* Promote access to Boston Harbor as a shared natural resource.
* Preserve and enhance the industrial port.
* Plan the Seaport as a vital, mixed-use neighborhood.
* Develop the Seaport as an integral part of Boston's economy.
* Enhance the South Boston community.
The 116-page document outlined the historical and regulatory framework of the Seaport,
followed by an analysis of its physical characteristics compared to other similar districts in
waterfront cities throughout the world. After outlining a physical plan for the Seaport, the
document gave an overview of the transportation network and concluded with an implementation
strategy for the public realm plan.
s Macero, Cosmo Jr. Boston Herald. August 5, 1998.
29 Ibid.
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In response to the extensive community input regarding housing, the Seaport Public Realm Plan
called for between 5,000 and 8,000 units of housing to be constructed in the Seaport and South
Boston neighborhood. Responding to community concerns regarding building heights, the plan
suggested a restriction of 75 foot heights for buildings within 200 feet of the bulkhead (Figure 1-
13). In the next zone, buildings were allowed to step up to 100 to 150 feet in height. In the areas
marked 150' PDA, the predominant maximum height was set at 150 feet, but a developer may
propose greater height on an individual building providing the overall building heights in that
area average less than 150 feet.
I The public reaction to the Seaport Public
Realm Plan was generally favorable, with
many of the Seaport advocates able to see
aspects of their ideas in the plan. For
example, the park system linking the
Convention Center with the Fort Point
Channel was an enhancement of an idea
from the BSA plan (Figure 1-14). Also, the
city-wide call for more housing seemed to
have been heard. Columnist David Eisen of
the Boston Herald referred to the new plan
Figure 1-13: Building Heights as offering "common sense', compared to
Source: BRA Seaport Public Realm Plan. 1999 the interim plan which was "the City
capitulating completely to developer greed", referring to the apparent reduction of building
heights.30
BRA Director Tom O"Brien stated that the plan,
"represents a consensus from hundreds of community meetings and consultations
with private urban planners and design professionals. Its something that when
you look back , all of us, and anybody who really cares about this area, can really
be proud of. We took in a lot of comments that didn't always match up with each
other, and tried to sort it all out." 31
30 Eisen, David. Boston Herald. March 7, 1999.
31 Flint,Anthony. Boston Globe. March 1, 1999.








Figure 1-14: 1999 Seaport Public Realm Plan
Source: Boston Redevelopment Authority.
The Seaport Public Realm Plan. February 1999.
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Not everyone was happy with the new plan, however. Council President James Kelly was upset
that his limit of 4,000 units of new housing in the Seaport was ignored, and the name of the plan
was changed, deleting "South Boston" from the title. Kelly suggested that he and the South
Boston community could lose over $20 million in linkage funds if the amount of new housing
increased from 4,000 to 8,000 units.32 The idea of losing millions in potential linkage money and
South Boston's identity with the Seaport offended Kelly who vowed to "do anything to stop
them from destroying South Boston".33
Economic Context
The Boston Central Business District office market is the hottest in the Country with a vacancy
rate of only 5.2 percent and a 27 percent median rent increase over the past year.34 Boston's
class A rents (high quality, prime location) are now the highest in the Nation, surpassing
Manhattan and San Francisco.35 This hot market combined with a shortage of space in the CBD
is why the Seaport looks so good to commercial developers.
The BRA produced a report in December of 1998 entitled Effects of Seaport Development on
Neighborhood Housing Demand. The report describes the delicate balance that occurs between
residential and commercial land uses in order to achieve a desirable neighborhood character.
Recognizing the fact that commercial uses can usually outbid residential uses for land, the report
developed a Neighborhood Housing Pressure Index which can show how much pressure would
be put on existing South Boston housing stock depending on the amount of commercial space
built in the new Seaport district.
The recommendation of the n~J.;ort was that 8,000 units of housing should be built in the new
Seaport area to minimize the impact on South Boston housing stock of affluent newcomers who
decide to live in the city.36 Despite this recommendation, the leaders in South Boston are holding
3:! Marantz, Steve. Boston Herald. April 22, 1999.
JJ Macero, Cosmo Jr. Boston Herald. March 2, 1999.
34 Source: Cushman & Wakefield, Inc. study, reported in Business Week, July 19, 1999
35 Ibid.
36 According to the report, 39 percent of new workers elect to live in Boston.
30
firm at limiting new housing in the Seaport to 4,000 units. One of the reasons for their
reluctance about more housing is that it does not produce the linkage money for which they have
negotiated so hard.
Table 1-2: Median Advertised Rents in Boston Neighborhoods
Source: City of Boston Department of Neighborhood Development. Real Estate Trends. March 10, 1999.
Data compiled from advertised rents listed in the Boston Sunday Globe.
For most residents of South Boston, and the rest of the city as well, the question is not how many
new residential units should there be, but rather, how can I afford to keep living here? Today,
the median price for a home in the Boston area is $206,400. In the City of Boston, the median
price of a single family home was $158,000, a 17 percent increase between 1997 and 1998. For
home owners who can afford their property taxes, the increases represent growth in net worth.
For renters, the news is all bad. Rents for a typical apartment in South Boston have increased
68.5 percent from 1991 to 1998. In the same period, rent for a typical two-bedroom apartment in
One Two Three Average
Bedroom Bedroom Bedroom of
Neighborhood Median Median Median Medians
Back Bay/Beacon Hill $ 1,375 $ 1,900 $ 2,250 $ 1,842
Central $ 1,200 $ 2,200 $ 2,000 $ 1,800
South End $ 1,250 $ 1,500 $ 1,800 $ 1,517
Charlestown $ 1,025 $ 1,400 $ 1,900 $ 1,442
Citywide $1,000 $1,350 $1,550 $ 1,300
Fenway/Kenmore $ 925 $ 1,350 $ 1,443 $ 1,239
AlIIston/Brighton $ 875 $ 1,200 $ 1,500 $ 1,192
South Boston $ 775 $1,200 $1,500 $ 1,158
Jamaica Plain $ 838 $ 1,100 $ 1,400 $ 1,113
West Roxbury $ 750 $ 1,000 $ 1,300 $ 1,017
Roslindale $ 800 $ 900 $ 1,200 $ 967
East Boston $ 650 $ 950 $ 1,150 $ 917
Hyde Park $ 695 $ 850 $ 1,150 $ 898
Roxbury $ 650 $ 838 $ 1,200 $ 896
Dorchester $ 600 $ 800 $ 900 $ 767
Mattapan $ 550 $ 700 $ 875 $ 708
South Boston has increased 72.7 percent, going from $695 to $1200 a month. The good news for
South Boston is that its median rents are still lower than the City wide median (Table 1-2). 37
In 1986, the BRA commissioned a report on the connection between office development and
housing costs in the City of Boston.38 This eventually became the "official" rationale for the
linkage program in Boston. While office development is a contributing factor to the shortage of
affordable housing in Boston, institutional uses cannot be ignored as a source of part of the
problem. A BRA study in 1995 indicated that there are 32 colleges, universities and graduate
schools in the City of Boston, and 24 of those institutions are in a growth mode. Sixty-four
percent of the students, equaling roughly 85,000 people, live outside of campus housing,
competing with other Boston residents for affordable housing. 39
The City has been working with the institutions to alleviate the pressure from the student market
on the rental stock. In fact, at a Neighborhood Housing Trust meeting on July 1, 1999, $196,000
in linkage money was approved for an innovative partnership between a private developer,
Northeastern University, and the City of Boston, for developing Student dorms and affordable
housing as part of the same project. The City had approached Northeastern University with an
offer of free land if the University would build a 600 bed dormitory in the neighborhood. As
part of negotiations with local residents, the University also agreed to build 60 units of affordable
housing for the community. Assuming four students typically live in one house, this innovative
program opened up 210 new affordable housing opportunities for the community.
Summary
In summary, a long neglected industrial waterfront in a prime location is springing to life due to
billions of dollars in infrastructure investments combined with a hot real estate market. The
adjacent South Boston community astutely claims the land as theirs and uses good timing and
political muscle to hold the Mayor's pet project hostage until he advocates the majority of
37 Boston Redevelopment Authority. Effects of Seaport Development on Neighborhood Housing Demand.
December 1998.
38 Kayden, Jerold and Case, Karl and Pollard, Robert. The Linkage Between Office Development and Housing Costs
in the City of Boston. Boston Redevelopment Authority. Boston, MA. January 1986.
linkage money coming out of this real estate gold mine. Before the Mayor even realizes what a
negotiating error he made, the South Boston leaders set up a new structure for handling the
linkage proceeds which threatens to change linkage procedures that have been in place for over a
decade. These changes pose a threat to Boston's linkage program at a time when the City
desperately needs more affordable housing to stem the tide of rising house prices and rents.
In the remainder of this thesis, I will review the history of South Boston to illustrate how a series
of repetitive events have led to the position the South Boston community takes today regarding
linkage and affordable housing. I will then review the legal and historical aspects of linkage in
Boston as background for analyzing the Neighborhood Housing Trust through two Mayoral
administrations. After determining what the City has learned about awarding linkage money
over the past 13 years, I will review the South Boston Betterment Trust to determine how it will
impact the linkage process. I will conclude with a summary of what I have learned and some
recommendations for how the City can move the South Boston Seaport planning process forward
while protecting the linkage program for future generations.
39 Boston Redevelopment Authority. How College Students Impact Boston's Economy and Neighborhoods. 1995.
Chapter Two: South Boston
Responding to the release of the Seaport Public Realm Plan in March of 1999, City Council
President and South Boston resident James M. Kelly accused Mayor Tom Menino of trying to
create an upscale, Newbury Street-style neighborhood on the waterfront.
"We were told there would be benefits in exchange for the turmoil. Now they're
taking all the opportunities away from us and building a new section, and they don't
want it to be like South Boston; they want it to be like Newbury Street," Kelly said.
"I take that personal. I'm damn mad about it, and the Mayor knows I'm mad about
it. I'm going to oppose much of the revitalization of this district."'
Much of Councilor Kelly's anger was targeted to the portion of the plan calling for the construction
of 8,000 new housing units in the Seaport district. BRA Director Tom O'Brien responded to
Kelly's statements by reminding him that the South Boston community has had a series of wins
over the past two years, including lower building heights, linkage dollars, and the establishment of
the South Boston Betterment Trust. The only two remaining items were the amount of housing to
be built in the seaport and the name of the district. In response to Kelly's demands for less
housing, O'Brien said,
"We may be the only city in America that is actually proposing to limit the number
of housing starts in and around our downtown. Every other city in America is
desperate to create housing. This is a foolish argument."2
Two weeks later, an outraged Kelly publicly threatened O'Brien at a community meeting, saying
"so help me God, I'm going to get you," because he felt the title of the Seaport Public Realm Plan
showed disrespect to the South Boston community.3
On June 12, 1999, Mayor Tom Menino brought an end to the fighting by ordering the new Seaport
District to be officially known as the "South Boston Waterfront." The executive order also limited
the amount of new residential construction in the Seaport to 4,000 units over the next ten years.4
James Kelly thanked the Mayor, saying "the important thing is that people from places like
Flint, Anthony. Boston Globe. March 2, 1999.
2 Flint, Anthony. Boston Globe. April 16, 1999.
3 Ibid.
4 Marantz, Steve. Boston Globe. June 12, 1999.
Lincoln, Wellesley and Dover should not be naming the district."5  The Conservation Law
Foundation criticized the announcement as an attempt to dismantle the Seaport plan. The CLF
claimed that the South Boston community would start by trying to control the name and amount of
housing, and keep going from there until the balance of power was shifted away from the City to
South Boston.6 When asked why he would oppose more housing in the Seaport when people in
his neighborhood were being priced out of their homes, Council President Kelly responded, "I
wasn't hired to look at the big picture, I was hired by the voters to respond to their problems, real or
imagined. '"
Planners have become accustomed to gathering opinions and suggestions from large diverse groups
of people in multiple neighborhoods, and turning those opinions and their implications into
comprehensive plans for entire communities. While this is a difficult task, it seems much easier
than the Boston Redevelopment Authority's job of convincing a handful of South Boston
politicians to do the right thing for the entire city of Boston. Currently, South Boston leaders and
the South Boston Betterment Trust hold the key to planning in the Seaport district. To learn how
this has happened, it is important to understand the history of South Boston.
History of South Boston
Boston College historian Thomas O'Connor suggested in his book, South Boston: My Home
Town , that South Boston has survived with fewer changes in its social, ethnic and religious
composition than any other Boston neighborhood. He describes it as "one of the last surviving
relics of a distinctive way of life that goes back to the early days of immigrant Irish-Catholic
families and old-time political bosses". 8
South Boston was not always an Irish-Catholic stronghold. The settlement of Dorchester began in
1630 with the arrival of John Winthrop's fleet of ships carrying puritans from England trying to
escape the religious persecution in their homeland. The captain of the ship Mary and John, with
5 Marantz, Steve. Boston Globe. June 12, 1999.
6 Ibid.
7 Cohen, Rachelle. Boston Herald. April 22, 1999.
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Note the Town of Dorchester at the bottom of the map, as well as Dorchester Neck and
Castle Island. The area labeled "Dorchester Flats" is the current Seaport District.
Figure 2-1: Boston in 1775
Source: From the observations of lieu. Page of His Majesty's Corps of Engineers.




























140 passengers from Devon, Dorset and Somerset in England, decided not to follow the fleet up the
Charles River, instead landing on Nantasket. 9 They eventually moved onto a peninsula which the
Native Americans called Mattapan. The Settlers called their new home Dorchester after their native
town in England (Figure 2-1).10
In 1633, the settlers elected 12 "Selectmen" who met monthly to enact laws and provide structure
for the colony. This was one of the first town meeting systems developed in the new country.
More people and livestock started arriving from England, including the Reverend Richard Mather
who arrived in 1635 with 100 people and over 30 livestock." The new colony began looking for a
convenient location to graze their growing herds, and found a peninsula called Mattapannock, later
known as Dorchester Neck (eventually South Boston). It was customary for all Dorchester settlers
to graze their livestock on Mattapannock until about 1637, when the town restricted the use of the
pastures to only100 of the most prominent families. In exchange for the right to graze their cattle,
these families made a commitment to maintain the infrastructure including fences, roads and the
causeway linking Mattapannock with Dorchester. Other less prominent settlers were allowed to
graze their livestock in a common pasture in exchange for a small "grazing" tax.12
Over the course of the next century, the original 100 Dorchester families broke up their land into
varying sizes and shapes as ensuing generations split the property among heirs. By 1650, about a
dozen families moved from Dorchester to build permanent residences on Mattapannock, eliminating
the common grazing and initiating the first settlement in the area that is now considered South
Boston. Dorchester Neck, as the land had come to be known, remained unnoticed by the rest of
Boston until the opening shots of the American Revolution rang out on April 19, 1775, turning the
peninsula and Castle Island just East of the peninsula into a strategic location for British and
American troops.13
By the end of the 18th Century, rapid expansion of Boston's population caused speculators to look
to Dorchester Neck for development. In 1803, several well-known Boston businessmen determined
that the Town of Boston needed room to grow and figured Dorchester Neck had the best chance of
gaining annexation approval from the Commonwealth. They bought a large piece of land on the
peninsula and then asked the Town of Boston to petition for annexation of the entire peninsula in
an attempt to increase land prices. The inhabitants of Dorchester Neck were opposed to the change,
9 O'Connor, Thomas. South Boston: My Home Town. Quinlan Press. Boston. 1988. P.7.
1o Ibid. p. 7.
" Ibid. p. 7.
12 Ibid. p. 9.
13 Ibid. p. 10.
considering the peninsula as belonging to them. Working through the Town of Dorchester, they
held several meetings and eventually voted to oppose the annexation petition. In a memorial sent to
the Senate and House of Representatives, the Town of Dorchester agreed to the construction of a
bridge linking Boston to the peninsula, but opposed the annexation. The town was offered as much
as $20,000 from Boston's business community to withdraw their opposition to the annexation bill,
but they refused all offers. 14 On March 6, 1804, the legislature passed the annexation bill and the
citizens of Dorchester lost their jurisdiction over the peninsula as well as any of the money
previously offered. 15 If this $20,000 offering was Boston's first informal attempt at "linkage", the
residents of South Boston learned a valuable early lesson.
The passage of the bill officially changed the name of the peninsula to South Boston and initiated
the construction of two bridges to the Town of Boston. Land prices increased dramatically with
lots that sold for $40 an acre in 1803, selling for $500 an acre one year later. At the time of
annexation, South Boston consisted of 600 acres of upland and nineteen tax paying land owners
who instantly became very wealthy. 16
Boston made the switch from Town to City status in 1822. South Boston was made part of Ward
12, which included much of the South End. South Enders and South Boston residents argued
about how many representatives they should have on the newly formed Common Council, and
ended up going into the elections supporting four-man slates of candidates from each district. The
South Enders successfully elected all four representatives leaving South Boston without a member
on the Council, marking perhaps the first and last time South Boston was underrepresented in
Boston politics. Within about 10 years, the population of the peninsula grew enough for it to get its
own member on the Council. Soon thereafter, city leaders agreed that the peninsula had grown
enough to warrant the formation of its own ward. On December 10, 1838, South Boston became
Ward 12 and was able to elect four members to the city's Common Council."7
It did not take long for the new Ward to start flexing its newfound political muscle. In an 1847
memorial sent to the leaders of the City of Boston, South Boston residents claimed:
"That it has not only the capacity, but the actual material necessary for a separate
and independent municipal existence. That it has no natural connection with, much
less any necessary dependence upon, the City of Boston, being separated from it by
a deep and navigable channel. That its municipal union with the city is merely
arbitrary and political, for the continuance of which there can be no good reason
14 O'Connor, Thomas. P. 16.
5 Simonds, Thomas C. History of South Boston. Arno Press. New York. 1974. P. 72.
16 Ibid. P. 77.
17 O'Connor, Thomas. P. 31.
except reciprocity of advantages. That heretofore most of the advantages of the
union have been reaped by the City proper, while the disadvantages have fallen upon
South Boston." 18
152 years later....
The residents of South Boston had good reason to feel that they had reaped the disadvantages of
the new "union". Once Boston reached City status, politicians began looking for ways to provide
public assistance for the downtrodden and sick members of the city. A smallpox hospital had
already been established on the South Boston peninsula, and it was followed by the Perkins
Institute for the Blind, the Massachusetts School of Idiots, Carney Hospital and House of Industry.
In addition, city leaders purchased 53 acres of land on the peninsula which became known as the
City Lands, where they built the House of Industry, a poorhouse, a house of correction for adults
and one for children, and a lunatic asylum.19 The large number of institutional uses being built on
the peninsula made the residents feel as though they had gone from the picnic grounds to the
dumping ground for the City of Boston. The feeling of not being respected by the City of Boston
became a constant source of resentment for the neighborhood that continues today.
150 years later, the City of Boston was once again proposing large institutional uses for the South
Boston Seaport that other neighborhoods did not want, such as sports stadiums and convention
centers. This time, the South Boston community had political strength on their side and easily
crushed the plans for a football stadium. To the residents of South Boston, there wasn't much
difference between the Massachusetts School for Idiots in the mid-1800's and a convention center
for tourists in the late 1900's, except now, they were going to be reap some of the "advantages of
the union" with the City of Boston.
City Council President James Kelly's remarks at the Boston Harbor Conference on April 16, 1998,
where he blasted the City of Boston for once again neglecting the needs of the residents of South
Boston, were eerily reminiscent of the wording in the 1847 memorial to the City of Boston. Again,
"South Boston did not ask for a convention center, but it has resigned itself to the
fact that it has a great back yard and now we're going to get something for it."
Peggy Davis-Mullen,
City Councilor from South Boston
Boston Globe. March 20, 1998.
'" Simonds, Thomas C. P. 300.
'19 O'Connor, Thomas. P. 30.
on March 2,1999, he was quoted in the Boston Globe regarding the City's plans for the South
Boston Seaport area:
"I and the people of South Boston have been shown a tremendous amount of
disrespect. Someone put it into the mayor's mind and Tom O'Brien's mind that
history will say they created a new Seaport District. Well, I am personally offended
by that, and I'll do anything to stop them from destroying South Boston."
It is interesting to note that the disadvantaged South Boston resident of 1847 was very different
from the predominantly Irish-Catholic resident James Kelly is trying to protect in 1999, though the
message has not changed appreciably over 152 years. The South Boston residents of 1847
described themselves as:
"a class of intelligent and respectable persons of narrow means, but independent
spirits, who wished to dwell in their own houses and elbow room about them, and
pure air to enjoy." They went on to say: "In the whole of the population there is
not a single colored family, and not so many foreigners as in several other wards of
the City. The foreigners who reside here, are, for the most part, of that better class
who will not live in cellars, or congregate together closely in order to keep each other
warm". 20
The reference to a "better class" of immigrant was an attempt to demonstrate that the immigrants
residing in South Boston were not a drain on the system like some of the others coming to Boston
at the time. This was all about to change with Ireland's potato famine of the late 1840's.
While the peninsula was predominantly composed of native Bostonians in 1847, the complexion of
the district began to change as early as the 1830's when a few Irish immigrants moved to the
peninsula. Generally, these immigrants were displaced artisans and well-to-do farmers from the
northern portions of Ireland, and contributed immediately to the growing economy of Boston.
The Irish tended to settle in the North End and the South Cove Fort Hill neighborhood, since they
could not afford to pay the tolls to cross the bridges and needed to stay close to their low-skill, low-
paying waterfront jobs. The original residents of these neighborhoods moved out to avoid the drop
in status that was associated with the new Irish immigrants.2 1
Prior to 1830, immigrants landing in Boston, including the Irish, disbursed relatively quickly
around the Boston area with many of them heading west almost immediately upon setting foot on
Boston's shores. During the years of the potato famine in Ireland, beginning in 1846, the Irish
immigrants landing in Boston could not go anywhere else because they were too weak from hunger
20 Simonds, Thomas C. P. 308.
21 Handlin, Oscar. Boston's Immigrants. Harvard University Press. Cambridge, MA. 1959. P.88.
Figure 2-2: Boston in 1842
Source: Branch, Melville C. An Atlas of Rare City Maps.
Princeton Architectural Press. New York. 1997
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and malnutrition. Immigrant landings increased from 3,936 in 1840 to 28,917 in 1849, with the vast
majority being impoverished Irish.22 The Irish were Catholics in a Protestant city. This fact, along
with the desperate nature of their flight from poverty in Ireland, and their large numbers, marked
them as a different kind of immigrant group, looked down upon by the rest of the city. It did not
help that Boston was a city based in finance and the professions, and was unable to make use of all
of this new unskilled labor. As a result, the Irish offered little to the Boston economy and remained
mostly unemployed, or worked as menial laborers.23
Not long after the Memorial of 1847, a transition started occurring in South Boston. The South
Boston docks and new manufacturing industry started drawing more working class and poor Irish
looking for common laborer jobs, particularly after the Dorchester railroad and Broadway railroad
arrived around 1857, making the peninsula more accessible.24 Despite a small influx of Italian and
Jewish immigrants, by the end of the nineteenth century, the life and society of South Boston had
become completely dominated by the patterns and customs of Irish-Catholic culture.2 5
Over the years, these immigrants started settling in and began taking great pride in the beauty of
their neighborhood, especially Marine Park, which became the final link in Frederick Law
Olmsted's Emerald Necklace park system. As part of the Emerald Necklace plan, a causeway was
built from Marine Park to Castle Island in 1890, drawing people from throughout Boston. Soon
South Boston residents were complaining that the park was attracting too many undesirables to
their neighborhood, citing the large number of Cambridge people being arrested on Sundays.26
110 years later......
22 Handlin, Oscar. P. 52.
3 Handlin, Oscar. P.51.
24 Ibid. p.98.
25 O'Connor, Thomas. P. 71.
26 Ibid. p. 110.
"Complaints are coming in by residents that the Castle Island parking lot is becoming
a hangout by large numbers of teens late at night into the early morning hours. We
have talked with State Police who have told us that funding has been made available to
bring in extra troopers to patrol the area and clear out any trouble makers....These
are not local kids who gather here at night, they are coming in from other parts of
Boston as well as surrounding suburbs."
John Cicconne, SBBT Trustee
South Boston Herald
Circa 1999
The early 1900's brought World War I and the infamous Boston Police strike of 1919. The police
strike was significant because of the rioting that caused two deaths in South Boston. After the
strike, South Boston's Irish-Catholics once again felt singled out from the rest of Boston as a
disproportionate number of Irish-Catholic police officers lost their jobs and were never allowed
back on the force. Residents also felt bitter about Harvard students who were hired as strike
breakers and were assigned to patrol the streets of South Boston. This dramatized for local
residents the class differences that still existed between them and the upper class establishment in
Boston.27
One positive result of the police strike was the binding together of the poorer people of the lower
end district with the more well-to-do community east of Dorchester Street. The us versus them
attitude towards other Bostonians helped bind both neighborhoods together for a common cause.
In addition to varying economic conditions, South Boston was developing very distinct ethnic and
national groups including Irish, Germans, Italians, Poles, Lithuanians, Czechs, Armenians and
Albanians. At work and in political affairs, these groups learned to work together, but in private and
personal affairs, each group was expected to "stay with its own kind". 28 Mixed marriages were
out of the question and lines were clearly drawn where each ethnic group would live in the
neighborhood. It was understood that Jewish people did business in South Boston but did not live
there. Black people, many of whom now lived in the South End of Boston, rarely came into the
neighborhood except for occasional visits to the beach. Because many of the young white
residents had no reason to leave the neighborhood and young blacks had no reason to come into the
neighborhood, it was not unusual for South Boston whites to grow to adulthood without having
seen or spoken to a black person.29
The post World War II era brought significant changes to South Boston. A number of the old
institutions that bound people together began to weaken, families were getting smaller, and the
Catholic Church was slowly losing the influence it had before the war. Many of the young men
and women who left for the war lost their attachment to the old neighborhood. Even those that
wanted to remain in the old neighborhood after their return from the military were discouraged by
banks that did not want to grant mortgages in what they considered a blighted neighborhood. As a
result, many young veterans and their families moved into the suburbs, causing the population of
South Boston to begin a decline that would continue for several decades.
27 In one of my interviews with a South Boston resident, he admitted that he does not openly admit that he works at
Harvard because he would lose respect in the neighborhood.
28 O'Connor, Thomas. P. 173.
Public housing was another powerful force in the changing character of South Boston. Because of
Congressman John W. McCormack's influence, South Boston was chosen as the site for Boston's
first public housing project under the Public Works Administration program. In 1938, Old Harbor
Village (later renamed the Mary Ellen McCormack Project after Congressman McCormack's
mother) was open for new residents. The rents were set high enough that a family without at least
one full-time wage earner could not afford to live there.
In 1939, The Boston Housing Authority started constructing the Old Colony Project. To live in
this project, families had to be Boston residents for at least one year, and preference was given to
South Boston residents that were displaced by the construction of the project. These first two
housing projects were generally accepted in the South Boston community because they were built
on the outskirts of the district and occupied primarily by family and friends from the neighborhood.
In fact, with the help of the local housing managers, units were often handed down to family and
friends when the older residents moved out, maintaining a very homogeneous population for several
decades.
The construction of the D Street Project in 1949 brought with it a new neighborhood dynamic. Its
676 apartments were isolated economically and socially from the rest of South Boston. The Urban
renewal of the 1950's and 60's displaced many of the chronically poor from throughout the city at
a time when the courts were making it impossible for housing managers to orchestrate which
families would be accepted into the project. Families without fathers and public welfare cases
began to dominate the D Street Project, causing long-time South Boston residents to not consider it
part of their community. 30
According to Thomas O'Connor, opposition to the D Street Project was not because seventy-one
families were black or because a large group was Hispanic. According to South Boston residents at
the time, the resentment was directed at the newcomers because they were "poor, dirty and
slovenly." 3' Families from Dorchester, Roxbury and the West End were "riffraff" or "project
rats".32 They were never regarded as true residents of South Boston. The older inhabitants of the
neighborhood were afraid that the whole neighborhood would be labeled as "lower class" as a result
of the newcomers. It is ironic that these are the exact things that were being said about many of
these same South Boston residents back in the 1840's when they were the new immigrants to
Boston.
29 O'Connor, Thomas. P. 173.
30 Ibid. p. 200.
31 Ibid. p.200.
One of the defining moments in the 300 year history of South Boston was the busing war of the
1970's. The Massachusetts State Legislature passed the Racial Imbalance Act in August of 1965,
stating that any school which was more than 50 percent black was racially imbalanced. At the time
of the Act, Boston was about the only city in the Commonwealth that had enough black students to
make it an issue. Many city residents were bitter that liberal, upper class, suburban lawmakers were
placing the demands of segregation on the city while effectively stopping minorities from locating
in their communities through their own creative zoning. Nowhere were city residents more
outspoken against the Act than in South Boston. South Boston leaders like Louise Day Hicks and
Ray Flynn worked with the Boston School Committee to fight the implementation of the Racial
Imbalance law. After dragging on for years, the NAACP finally filed a class action law suit against
the Boston School committee, and on June 21, 1974, Judge W. Arthur Garrity ruled that the School
Committee had "knowingly carried out a systematic program of segregation" and went about
developing his own plan for how to fix the problem. 33 Busing children from their neighborhood
schools to other schools throughout the city was the primary way the judge planned to fix the
problem. South Boston High School and Roxbury High School were chosen as "Sister schools"
in the Garrity plan, with many critics suggesting that it was an attempt to humiliate the leadership of
South Boston who fought so bitterly to stop the idea years earlier.
For the next several years, people throughout the country turned on the nightly news to hear about
violence and racism in South Boston, painting a picture of the neighborhood that residents felt was
unfair. They claimed that it was not an issue of racism as much as the desire to control the
educational choices and safety for their children, and that they had been "singled out" from the rest
of the city. 3 4 At a rally in Washington, D.C., Senator William Bulger denounced the "public
contempt" to which the people of South Boston had been subjected, and condemned the portrayal
of Southies, in the local and national media, as racists.3 5
25 years later.....
32 O'Connor. P.200.
33 Ibid. p. 216.
34 Ibid. p.224.
35 Ibid. P.224.
South Boston High School, once a source of pride for a tightly knit neighborhood
but in the last quarter-century a symbol of turmoil in Boston's struggle with busing, is
on its way to being closed and replaced with a new facility outside of the
neighborhood.... The old facility, built in 1901, would be turned into affordable
housing for residents feeling the crunch of a red-hot real estate market, with assisted
living quarters for seniors and an adult education and job training center possibly
included as well.
One outgrowth of the busing crisis was the unification that it brought to the South Boston
community. As many other neighborhoods were losing their ethnic character, South Boston
residents started encouraging their children to study their ethnic origins. The Irish, in particular,
became very vociferous with their cries of "green power" while displaying t-shirts, bumper stickers
and signs proclaiming the attributes of the Irish.36
Another effect of the busing crisis was the changing relationship between the Church and the
community. For hundreds of years, the Catholic Church and South Boston residents, especially the
Irish, spoke with one voice. In fact, much of the life of the community centered directly on the
church. During the busing crisis, however, the church took a more tolerant stand than most
residents cared for, causing many to stop looking to the local priest for answers and instead, turning
to the local politician.37
The busing crisis was the launching pad for the political careers of anti-busing advocates. Jim
Kelly started the South Boston Information Center as a clearing house for "the correct news" that
Southies could trust. This was an attempt to avoid what was seen as a biased local and national
media towards South Boston. Kelly used the Information Center as a forum for his successful City
Council campaign in 1983.38 Ray Flynn ran successfully for Mayor in 1983, and William Bulger
became President of the Massachusetts Senate in 1979. With Joseph Moakley in the United States
36 Ibid. p.225.
37 Gelzinis, Peter. Interview. July 1, 1999
38 Ibid.
"The high school has been the source of problems since September of 1974 [ the first
day of busing] . If it's not going to be the neighborhood's high school, let's use it for
other purposes," said City Council President James M. Kelly, of South Boston. Like
most high schools in Boston, South Boston is mostly composed of minority students
who are bused in from other neighborhoods.
"It's become a symbol of trouble rather than . . . tradition," said state Representative
Jack Hart, a South Boston Democrat. "There are larcenies along G street. Things get
stolen from in front of houses. And we don't know who these kids are." Meanwhile,
Hart said, "There is a crisis in housing in the neighborhood." He and others said the
renovation project for the old high school could be delegated to the South Boston
Betterment Trust, which was set up to create affordable housing with funds from
development of the waterfront.
Anthony Flint
Boston Globe, June 9, 1999
House of Representatives and Michael Flaherty as a representative in the state legislature, residents
felt certain they were headed for a brighter future.39
The Role of the Parish Priest and the Catholic Church
If there was one thing that drew the people of South Boston together, it was the Catholic Church.
Everything revolved around the Church, and the Church, in turn, became an integral part of almost
every aspect of family life. Most of the Irish who came to America retained an intense faith in their
religious beliefs and looked to their priests and the Church hierarchy for guidance and support.40
The role of the Catholic priest in South Boston went far beyond saying Mass every morning and
hearing confessions every Saturday evening. The parish priests would operate small clubhouses
close to the church, where they held activities during the week. They organized choirs, plays,
minstrel shows and operettas, where members of the parish could display their talents. The priests
also encouraged sports, with every parish in South Boston having its own baseball team that drew
large crowds on Saturday afternoons at Commonwealth Park.41 The Irish-Catholic community of
South Boston developed a culture very different from the larger community of traditional downtown
Boston. Its people clung tight to their church and revered their priests. "It was as if your church,
your parish church, was your extended family," one nun recalled, "and the priest was the father,
with all the patriarchal connotations." 42
The Catholic Church in South Boston was important in the way that it defined the role of authority
figures in the lives of the average "Southie". It also formulated a way of thinking for many of the
politicians that would later come out of South Boston. As an example, in the April 19, 1998 Boston
Globe article on linkage funds related to South Boston development, City Council President and
South Boston native James Kelly, listed improving parochial schools as one of his top choices for
what to do with over $60 million in expected funds. He was quoted as saying, "my pet charity is
the parochial school system, I am a product of the parochial school system. I see the enormous
good they do and the great education they provide."
39 O'Connor, Thomas. P. 236.
40 Ibid. P. 78.
41 Ibid. P. 80.
The Role of the Politician
Denied access to political power in their native Ireland for centuries, the Irish were determined to
achieve personal security and ethnic solidarity in their newly adopted home. In a city with a tightly
controlled financial establishment like Boston, newcomers, especially the Irish Immigrants, found
most opportunities for economic advancement were closed to them. Politics provided a road to
power and influence for those who were shrewd enough and tough enough to seize the opportunity.
"Those who took the leadership in Irish politics were strong men who ruled their wards with gentle
smiles and iron fists." Known as "bosses," these men established themselves as centers of
patronage and influence.43 For many of them, politics was more than a chance to gain personal
power or social advancement. It was an opportunity to provide assistance to his own people at a
time when they could not easily obtain many of the essentials of life on their own.44
In South Boston: My Home Town, Thomas H. O'Connor quotes John William Ward's definition
of the two major strains in Boston's approach to political policy and public interest. The older
strain, coming from traditional Puritan-Yankee-Brahmin sources, he called "rational politics". By
this he meant a coherent system of bureaucratic politics designed to work in the "public interest",
tending toward a political leader who steadfastly pursued the "general good" and resisted selfish
interests, pressure groups or single-issue constituencies. The second strain, the newer strain in
Boston history, Ward called "ethnic politics," a political culture that celebrates the personal,
emphasizes family and friendship, and rejects the notion of affection earned only by achievement
and performance. The emotional appeal of the ethnic politician, he said, is in a realm of "human
values," with little or no legitimacy in the rational bureaucratic world. 45
South Boston has been fortunate over the years to have powerful political leaders who have
understood the art of wielding that power for the good of the local community. The community has
been comfortable with its system of "ethnic Politics" because it has historically worked to its
advantage. South Boston's trust in its political leadership could also be a result of the strong Irish
Catholic culture of the community. It was a natural progression to rely first on the Parish priest,
then the ward boss, and now the local politicians. Much of the strength of South Boston's political
representatives comes from the deep mistrust the community has for outsiders. If South Boston
residents have a choice between trusting bureaucrats at the Boston Redevelopment Authority, or
James Kelly and Steven Lynch, who attended the local schools and are members of the local trade
unions, the decision is easy.
42 O'Connor, Thomas. P. 78, 126.
43 O'Connor, Thomas. P. 83
44 Ibid. P. 83.
In Boston's Immigrants, Oscar Handlin wrote that, "the Irish felt obliged to erect a society within
society, to act together in their own way. In every contact, the group became intensely aware of its
peculiar and exclusive identity". Thomas O'Connor, however, makes the point that it was native
Bostonians who encouraged the attitudes in various ethnic groups that they would do well to "stay
with their own kind" in their own neighborhoods.
"Well into the twentieth century, people in neighborhoods such as South Boston
grew up with the knowledge and the reassurance that this was the way it ought to be
- the way that was natural to Boston's 'city of neighborhoods'. They would live in
separate neighborhoods designed for different people, different nationalities,
different races, different religions - all living together happily, peacefully and
harmoniously - but always separately. '"4 6
In his book, The Uses of Disorder: Personal Identity and City Life, Richard Sennett claims that
cities in America have grown in such a way that ethnic areas have become homogeneous, with the
fear of outsiders growing to the extent that these ethnic communities have been cut off from the
larger community. He states that if the permeability of these neighborhoods were increased,
working class families would become more comfortable with people unlike themselves. Ironically,
he uses South Boston as his classic example of the "homogeneous ethnic neighborhood".47
In Sennett's view, integrating a neighborhood in this fashion would be introducing a sense of
disorder which is important for the health of the city. He believes that communities made
"disorderly" along these lines will be more likely to see a broadening of people active in city
leadership. Also, political "image" or personality would become a less important factor in
choosing elected officials, since charismatic "image" leaders appeal most to people who are
relatively passive in city affairs. City politicians would become "middlemen", balancing the needs
of the City with the desires of their constituents, instead of the gatekeepers that South Boston
currently has.4 8
45 Ibid. P. 84.
46 O'Connor, Thomas. P. 127.
47 Sennett, Richard. The Uses of Disorder: Personal Identity and City Life. P. 194.
48 The concept of South Boston politicians "guarding the gate" of public participation was articulated in a thesis by
MIT student Susan Crowl Silberberg in 1998. This thesis is an excellent reference for case studies of planning
interventions in South Boston.
Summary
Throughout its history, three themes are associated with the geographic area now known as the
South Boston community :
* Development pressure threatening to redefine the community.
In 1804, development pressure from Boston resulted in annexation and 1200 percent increases
in property values in one year, yet the residents of Dorchester neck did not have the political
muscle to fight the development wave . There have been consistent cycles of development
pressure over the years in South Boston, with varying levels of ability to fight them off.
* Reluctance to accept outsiders into the community.
There has always been a reluctance to accept outsiders into the South Boston community,
starting with the reluctance to accept the Irish Immigrants, to the Irish reluctance to accept
Blacks. Perhaps the isolation of Dorchester Neck played a role in fostering this attitude among
its inhabitants over the course of three centuries.
* Reliance on a small group of leaders to define the community's agenda.
From electing their first selectman in 1633, to parish priest, to ward bosses, the community has
always felt most comfortable relying on a small group of leaders to make decisions for them.
As South Boston's elected officials started gaining influence in Local, State and Federal offices,
they used ethnic politics as a tool for building personal power while making sure the district got
its share. Once the days of the Public Works Administration and Urban Renewal were over, it
became more difficult for South Boston's politicians to come home with money that did not
have rules and regulations attached, and ethnic politics started losing some its appeal.
After learning about the history of South Boston and its people, it is no longer a mystery why
achieving a "consensus" over the amount of housing to be built or even the name for the Seaport
district is such a struggle. This is a community that has a 160-year history of feeling like the
dumping ground for the city of Boston. What makes 1999 so unique is that once again there are
development pressures threatening to redefine South Boston, but for the first time, at least part of
the community is in a position to turn it to their advantage. South Boston has the good timing and
good fortune to have their political leaders in the right positions to capitalize on development this
time, and some members of the community see linkage money as the "pot of gold" with no strings
attached.
Chapter Three: Linkage In Boston
In Rachelle Alterman's 1989 paper entitled Evaluating Linkage, And Beyond, linkage is defined
as "a mechanism of land use regulation that requires or entices development of affordable
housing as a condition for permission to build or to obtain some 'bonus'. From a developer's
point of view, linkage is a requirement that a builder who intends to build x, must also build y".1
Linkage is an outgrowth of two earlier types of land use controls; exactions and inclusionary
zoning. Exactions have been around for decades, requiring developers to help finance the
construction of public facilities or amenities made necessary by a proposed development. For
example, if a new shopping mall made an additional stoplight necessary on a nearby intersection,
the developer would be asked to pay for that stoplight. Other examples include infrastucture,
parks and schools. Linkage has become an extension of this responsibility, with the major
difference being that linkage is not just about public facilities, but rather housing and job
training. Inclusionary zoning is a response to the "exclusionary" zoning that has taken place in
many communities for several years.2 Instead of zoning low-income people out of communities,
inclusionary zoning requires a certain percentage of all new housing to be set aside as affordable
housing for lower income residents, and for the developer to subsidize them for a period of time.3
In her paper, Alterman identifies five types of linkage programs including mandatory linkage,
quasi-mandatory, incentive-based, negotiated, and reverse linkage. Mandatory linkage is best
identified with San Francisco, where linkage was first established in 1980. This type of linkage
requires all commercial buildings over a certain floor area (currently 50,000 s.f. in San
1 Alterman, Rachelle. Evaluating Linkage, And Beyond. Lincoln Institute of Land Policy. February 1989. P. 3.2 Examples of exclusionary zoning include minimum lot and minimum house size requirements that are effectvely
large enough to exclude lower income groups.
3 Ibid. p. 5.
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Francisco) to pay a linkage fee. The developer can choose to develop the housing himself, or
pay an in-lieu fee. Linkage in San Francisco has evolved to include payments for public art,
open space, child care, and transit, totaling $13/s.f. for all fees.4
Quasi-mandatory linkage applies to any developer requesting some form of zoning relief such as
a variance, conditional use permit, or zoning change. In theory, if a developer does not require
any zoning relief, they do not pay linkage. As I will note later in this thesis, in a city like Boston,
it is easy to write zoning laws where almost every project will require some form of relief, and
therefore, have to pay linkage.
Reverse linkage is an interesting twist used in cities that do not have healthy Central Business
Districts such as Boston and San Francisco. With reverse linkage, fees are exacted on
development projects outside the downtown target area and targeted back to the central city
neighborhoods.
Incentive-based linkage allows developers to choose to apply for greater densities, more height,
or other relief in exchange for linkage paid. In this way, at least theoretically, both sides win,
since the developer gets more than zoning would allow and the community gets additional
affordable housing.
Negotiated linkage does not have a pre-set formula. It is usually negotiated on a case-by-case
basis. Though many express legal concerns over this type of linkage, it seems to be the most
popular with community groups, especially those with the most bargaining power.
History of Linkage in Boston
San Francisco pioneered the concept of linkage in 1980 with the Office/Housing Production
Program. It was a mandatory linkage program created through an administrative decision by the
City in response to the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA).5 CEQA called for
4 Alterman, Rachelle. P.10.
5 Alterman, Rachelle. P.8.
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mitigation measures to be imposed whenever an adverse physical environmental impact from
development was anticipated. To insure that their new linkage program would not lose if legally
challenged, the City authorized two studies, one in 1979 and another in 1984, to document the
link between construction of new office space, and an increased need for housing.6
In December of 1983, Boston joined San Francisco by implementing an affordable housing
linkage policy that could be considered "Quasi-Mandatory". Linkage in Boston was first
introduced by a coalition of citizens and public officials (including City Councilor Ray Flynn) in
1982. In early 1983, Mayor Kevin White vetoed a linkage proposal that had already been
approved by the City Council. After the controversy surrounding the veto, Mayor White
convened a 30 member advisory panel which conducted hearings throughout the Summer of
1983. Linkage became a major issue in the Fall Mayoral campaign with all but one of the eight
candidates endorsing some form of exaction on commercial development. In October, the
advisory panel issued a report recommending the establishment of a linkage program and Ray
Flynn, one of its biggest advocates, was elected Mayor in November.7
At the time, Boston had one of the strongest local economies in the nation. Between 1975 and
1988, developers added 17 million square feet of office space, three times the amount built in the
previous 35 years, and over 82,000 new office jobs in Boston.8 Boston's economic growth
helped to reverse a 30-year population decline, with a ten percent population growth between
1980 and 1988. 9 Unfortunately, the news in Boston wasn't all good. While the downtown was
booming, outlying neighborhoods suffered from poverty, abandonment and neglect. A shortage
of affordable housing forced many residents into unsafe and overcrowded conditions. In
addition, the Public Housing Authority was operating under receivership and the City's finances
were dismal as a result of Proposition 2-1/2.
Despite Boston's booming economy at the time, the city was limited in its ability to raise
revenues. Over 51 percent of the City's property was tax exempt due to the expansion of
6 Ibid. P. 8.




government institutions, hospitals, universities, colleges and cultural institutions. In 1984, total
property value in the City was valued at $23.6 billion, with $12.1 billion exempt from taxation.
Proposition 2 1/2, a statewide law enacted in 1979, further restricted Boston's revenue stream, by
limiting the overall property tax levy each year. This had a serious impact on Boston which had
previously relied heavily on property tax revenue to finance municipal services. The city was
unable to enact local option taxes such as sales and income taxes without state approval, and the
Commonwealth was not filling the gap for Boston as it lost one-third of its property tax revenue
between 1981 and 1984. To make matters worse, the Federal government began its urban policy
cutbacks in 1981, especially in low-income housing and jobs programs. 10
With these economic realities as a backdrop, and after much heated debate, Mayor White signed
an amendment to the zoning code on December 29, 1983, incorporating Article 26, providing
that any downtown project requiring a zoning action and involving new, substantially enlarged or
substantially rehabilitated office, hotel, retail, or institutional development pay a linkage fee.
The linkage policy required developers of "Development Impact Projects" either to build
affordable housing or to contribute money to build such housing. The amount was set at $5 for
every foot over 100,000 square feet, payable over 12 years.
It is ironic that Mayor White, known as the "friend of big business and downtown", finished his
last few weeks in office by signing a document transferring money from downtown to the
neighborhoods. It was Ray Flynn, the City Councilor from South Boston, who took the Mayoral
office in January of 1984, that really put together the linkage program we know today.
By the end of 1984, nine Development Impact Project (DIP) plans were approved by the BRA,
totaling $20.5 million in housing obligations. According to Article 26, the developers were to
make 12 equal annual installments to the Neighborhood Housing Trust. The first payment was
due upon the issuance of a certificate of occupancy for the project building or 24 months after
the granting of the building permit, whichever came first. Anticipating the influx of DIP funds,
9 Ibid.
"o Ibid.
the city passed an ordinance in June of 1986 officially establishing the Neighborhood Housing
Trust.
According to the ordinance, the Collector-Treasurer of the City was to establish the
Neighborhood Housing Trust (NHT) which,
"shall be established in the form and manner of the attached Declaration of Trust;
and that, subject to approval by the City Council and the Mayor, the
Neighborhood Housing Trust be and hereby is authorized to accept and expend
any and all funds contributed to it consistent with the purposes of the Declaration
of Trust attached hereto and filed herewith.""1
Prior to the ordinance authorizing the NHT, in February of 1986, the zoning ordinance was once
again amended with Article 26A modifying the time frame for developers of "downtown"
projects making linkage payments from 12 years down to seven years. Article 26B was also
added specifying that an additional $1 per square foot linkage would be collected for job
training, bringing total linkage exactions up to $6 per square foot. Both articles specified that a
certain percentage of linkage money should be reserved for the neighborhood(s) adjacent to
where the project is located. The amendment specifically suggested ten percent be set aside for
neighborhoods adjacent to downtown projects and 20 percent for neighborhoods adjacent to
projects located outside of downtown.
On August 21, 1986, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) gave the linkage program
new life as it set aside an earlier ruling of the lower court that said linkage legislation exceeded
the City's zoning powers and was therefore invalid (see Legal Issues section). In its decision, the
SJC observed that the legality of Article 26 should be addressed through legislative action rather
than litigation. The City took the advice and by September 30, 1987, the State Legislature
approved Chapter 371, officially giving the city permission to impose linkage fees.
Earlier in September of that same year, the NHT finally adopted its Declaration of Trust, making
official its rules and regulations. The Declaration of Trust was filed with the City of Boston and
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Also in 1987, in anticipation of the job training money,
the City passed an ordinance establishing the Neighborhood Jobs Trust (NJT). As with the
Neighborhood Housing Trust, the NJT was intended to be operated in accordance with its
"Declaration Of Trust" which outlined the rules and operating procedures.
Linkage was "officially" incorporated into Article 80 of the Boston Zoning Code on April 17,
1996, resulting from an effort by the City to streamline all zoning requirements into one
document. This "user-friendly" Article 80B-7 outlines the linkage requirements for developers
and includes the provisions of Articles 26, 26A and 26B. 12
Two years after the rules were finally clear to all of the players, a new agreement was signed that
could potentially change them once again. On March 11, 1998, a "Memorandum of
Understanding" between the BRA and South Boston political leaders established a charitable
organization called the "South Boston Betterment Trust" (SBBT) to receive over 50 percent of
all linkage money from the Seaport District, in exchange for the passage of the Convention
Center financing package. The agreement was validated by the BRA again in February 1999,
when the Seaport Public Realm Plan indicated that the SBBT was formed to "provide a vehicle
for housing funds to flow to South Boston". 13
Currently, there is not a clear answer for how money will be funneled to the SBBT. City Hall
insiders suggest that nothing will change with the linkage process in Boston and the SBBT will
simply become the vehicle for "community benefits" in the neighborhood. 14 Linkage money will
flow into the NHT and then 51 percent will be funneled to projects in the South Boston
neighborhood. South Boston insiders have a different opinion, which is that more than half of
the required linkage money from the South Boston Seaport is going to be funneled directly into
the SBBT. What is clear is that people are not discussing this issue publicly. Perhaps because
the politicians are still fighting over the correct name for the Seaport area, or more likely,
everyone knows this will be a thorny issue, and it is easier to avoid defining the topic too clearly
before the linkage money starts flowing.
" City of Boston Code, Section One, Ordinances, Title 10. June 6, 1986.
12 Boston Municipal Research Bureau, Inc. Boston's Linkage Program: A New Approach To Managing Linkage
Funds For Housing And Job Training. October 1998. P.3.
13 Boston Redevelopment Authority. The Seaport Public Realm Plan. February 1999. P.8.


















Linkage established in San Francisco.
Article 26 amended to the Boston Zoning Code establishing
affordable housing linkage in the City of Boston.
Article 26A amended to the Boston Zoning Code modifying some
of the linkage regulations previously established in Article 26.
Article 26B amended to the Boston Zoning Code establishing jobs
linkage in the City of Boston.
Boston City Council passes an ordinance establishing a
Neighborhood Housing Trust.
Bonan v. City of Boston.
The Massachusetts Supreme Court gives new life to linkage as it
sets aside an earlier ruling of the lower court.
Boston City Council passes an ordinance establishing a
Neighborhood Jobs Trust.
The Neighborhood Housing Trust adopts a set of Rules and
Regulations.
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County.
Establishes a new threshold of government liability if it is found
that regulations/exactions went too far.
Nollan v. The California Coastal Commission.
Nexus, Proportionality and advancing the State Interests.
The Neighborhood Housing Trust adopts a Declaration of Trust.
In response to Bonan v. City of Boston, the Massachusetts State
Legislature approves Chapter 371.
The BRA develops securitization of linkage in an effort to speed
up the production of affordable housing.
Linkage is officially incorporated into the Boston Zoning Code as
section 80B-7, entitled Development Impact Project Exactions.
Memorandum of Understanding signed between the BRA and
South Boston Politicians.
The Seaport Public Realm Plan is published by the BRA.
Legal Issues
It did not take long for the first legal challenge to Boston's new linkage program. One of the
City's first DIP agreements, signed on June 28, 1994, was with Massachusetts General Hospital
(MGH), for demolition of several existing structures and the construction of high-rise towers
along Charles Street. Seon P. Bonan, representing the commercial interests of the Charles River
Park development group, commenced a Civil action in the Massachusetts Superior Court on June
11, 1985. The Plaintiffs sought judgement declaring Article 26 of the Boston Zoning Code to be
invalid. They were essentially claiming that the zoning commission's approval of higher density
for the project was improperly influenced by the linkage requirement set forth in Article 26. The
complaint also asserted that the City lacked authority under its special zoning enabling
legislation to adopt Article 26, and therefore, the article should be nullified.
On April 11, 1986, the Massachusetts Superior Court entered a declaratory judgement, ruling
Article 26 of the Boston Zoning Code invalid. Bonan's victory was short-lived as the City
immediately appealed to the Massachusetts Supreme Court where on August 21, 1986, the
Superior Court decision was reversed. The reason the Supreme Court reversed the decision was
that the Plaintiffs failed to state why this development would have any direct adverse impact on
them. They also failed to prove that MGH, by virtue of their ability to contribute large sums of
money to unrelated projects in the City, was able to "unduly" influence the Zoning Commission.
The following quote came from the Court's decision:
"In particular circumstances, the existence of a potentially distracting, irrelevant
influence on a public agency's decision making process may cast doubt on the
fairness of the process and warrant careful judicial scrutiny. Here, however, the
plaintiffs have not alleged facts warranting such scrutiny. Unless and until the
plaintiffs make such allegations and prove them, they will not have established an
actual controversy with any defendant concerning the lawfulness of Article 26.
Article 26 may or may not be within the authority of the city to adopt, but is not a
question on which the plaintiffs are entitled to an answer until they can
demonstrate that they have been or will be substantially, adversely affected by
reason of the influence of Article 26 on the zoning commission's treatment of
MGH's 1984 development plan."15
15 Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. 398 Mass. 315; 496 N.E.2d 640; 1986 Mass. LEXIX 1460. This
information was found at web.lexis-nexis.com.
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In its opinion, the Court stated that there may very well be material facts that were not presented
that would make a good argument that Article 26 is not legal. The Court went on to suggest that
the Article 26 problems could be fixed more promptly and more fully through the legislature,
rather than the courts. The City of Boston took the hint, and submitted a Home Rule Petition to
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. On September 30, 1987, the State Legislature approved
Chapter 371, granting the City of Boston permission to impose linkage fees. Today, some
employees of the BRA suggest that the 1986 Massachusetts Supreme Court decision was a "free
judicial review" of linkage in Boston. The suggestion is that linkage in Boston met its challenge
and won. In a static world, that may be true, but it is not a static world, and in the summer of
1987, the United States Supreme Court handed down the Nollan and First English decisions
casting at least some doubt on the future of linkage.
Since linkage has not really faced a direct challenge in the courts, some advocates rely on
analogies to other existing policies where a body of law has already been established, such as
inclusionary zoning and exactions/impact fees. Some legal scholars view linkage as a
"downtown" inclusionary zoning policy, knowing that inclusionary zoning has been upheld in
several court decisions. 16 The flaw in this argument is that inclusionary zoning resulted because
housing developers and local authorities failed to supply mixed-income housing on their own
initiative. Since most downtown office developers are not in the housing development business,
it is difficult to pin blame on them for the lack of affordable housing in the city. Requiring them
to supply affordable housing is a much different issue than asking housing developers to ensure a
better income mix in their projects through "inclusionary" zoning requirements. 17
Exactions and impact fees have been debated at length in the courts, gaining acceptance in the
area of U.S. land-use regulation."8 As a result, advocates of linkage feel most comfortable
categorizing it as another form of exaction. Officials in San Francisco and Boston commissioned
studies to prove a connection between office development and housing demand, which gave
them the data to prove that "linkage" exactions were warranted.19 Assuming the studies are
16 Alterman. Op. Cit. p.30.
17 Ibid. p. 32.
18 Ibid. p.33.
19 Boston's paper on linkage was published six months after the beginning of the Bonan v. City of Boston Court case.
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correct and building downtown office buildings do cause a shortage of affordable housing, than
linkage is probably correctly categorized as a form of exaction, which makes the Supreme
Court's Nollan and First English decisions of 1987 all the more interesting.
Nollan v. The California Coastal Commission
The Nollan decision raised the bar on the court's scrutiny of exactions, asking the question, "Is
there a reasonable connection (rational nexus) between the need created by the new
development, and the exaction? If so, is the exaction "substantially advancing" a legitimate State
interest?
In addition, several State courts have developed the following tests for judging the legality of
exactions: Is the exaction a land use regulation or a disguised tax? Does the tax have the
appropriate authority? Is there rough proportionality between the amount the new development
is asked to bear and its share of the burden? Is there a rational relationship between the
expenditure of the funds and the benefits accruing to the donor?20
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County
In the First English decision, the Court not only invalidated the Los Angeles County ordinance
as a taking, but awarded compensation to First English Lutheran Church for the entire period the
taking was effective. Prior to this decision, compensation was always calculated from the date of
the claim. This decision raised the risk level for any government entity implementing programs
such as linkage, that could be ruled as takings in the future.
The point of this section is not to debate the legality of linkage, but rather to recast the light on
linkage as a valuable housing tool that should not be treated as Boston's birthright. Legal
scholars have done an exemplary job of drawing lessons from court cases similar to linkage, but
the fact remains that a linkage program similar to Boston's has never been tested in the Courts.
Any city, Boston included, that uses linkage as a means for building affordable housing has the
duty to run a program of the highest standards, to avoid the potential for a legal challenge which
20 Alterman, Rachelle.
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would ultimately endanger the future of affordable housing and the economic well-being of the
City.
The Housing Linkage Process
Boston's Housing linkage process begins with the BRA's large project review determining that a
development project is in need of zoning relief and involves more than 100,000 square feet.21
Following the initial BRA administrative and design review, the staff requests the BRA Board
hold a public hearing on the project. If all goes well at the public hearing, the Board takes a vote
authorizing the BRA Director to enter into a standard DIP agreement between the BRA and the
developer containing the DIP requirements articulated in the Zoning Code. Once the DIP
agreement has been executed, the BRA Director certifies to the Boston Zoning Commission or
the Zoning Board of Appeal, depending on the project, that the developer of a DIP project has
signed a DIP agreement. At that point, the regulating Board or Commission votes to grant the
zoning relief. The executed DIP agreement is also sent to the Treasury Department which is
responsible for collecting the payments due to the NHT. After obtaining zoning relief, the
developer of a DIP project can request a building permit from the Inspectional Services
Department (ISD). Before a building permit can be issued, the BRA must issue a Certificate of
Compliance confirming that the DIP project has complied with all of the applicable sections of
Article 80, including the DIP agreement.
The issuance of the building permit is supposed to trigger the Treasury Department to bill the
developer for linkage payments. 22 Currently, the first payment is owed two years after the
issuance of a building permit or at the issuance of the Certificate of Occupancy, whichever
comes first. Eventually, the developer's payments are sent to the Treasury Department where the
money is invested until requests are made from the NHT (see the City's diagram of the process in
Figure 3-1).





Figure 3-1: Neighborhood Housing Trust Flow Diagram
Source: City of Boston
The Impacted Neighborhood
Once a neighborhood is determined to be "impacted" by a commercial development project, it
has three possible sources of housing relief available through the linkage process. Most
communities have sophisticated neighborhood associations that negotiate directly with the
commercial developers and local politicians for "community benefits." These benefits are not
officially sanctioned by the City, but have been a part of development in Boston for decades.
Examples of contributions, in addition to the jobs and housing payments required by ordinance,
include everything from improving public parks, contributing to schools, and programs for
rr
youth, to building new streets and sidewalks. These community benefits are usually negotiated
on a case by case basis, with the value of benefits depending largely on the negotiating skills of
the community (Figure 3-2).
The second source of relief through linkage is the
standard linkage payment for housing and job
creation. Developers make their payments to the
NHT which is then obligated by Article 26A of
the Boston Zoning Ordinance to contribute "at
least" 10 or 20 percent of the linkage money to
projects in the impacted neighborhood. If the
commercial development is downtown, the
impacted neighborhood gets ten percent; if
outside of downtown, the impacted neighborhood
gets 20 percent. The remaining 80 or 90 percent
of linkage money is distributed throughout the
city by the NHT according to their specific
criteria (Figure 3-2).
Figure 3-2: Typical Sources of Linkage
Relief to Impacted Neighborhoods
The third source of relief is "Housing Creation" which is an option developers can choose by
creating, or causing to be created, affordable housing units in lieu of paying the housing
contribution grant. The amount of housing the developer must create is determined by
calculating the net present value of the stream of annual linkage payments he would make under
the traditional plan. The significant aspect of this option is that the BRA is responsible for
negotiating housing creation agreements under its own set of rules and regulations, and the NHT
acts only in an advisory role.
I
Neighborhood Housing Trust I (1986 - 1995)
The NHT was established by a City of Boston ordinance on May 21, 1986, and confirmed by the
Massachusetts Legislature with Chapter 371 of the Acts of 1987. The first Trust which I will
refer to as "NHT I" was formed in 1986, with Mayor Flynn making the appointments of
Trustees. The form of the Trust was determined by the Mayor and the City Council, with an
agreement that there would be five trustees in addition to the City Council President (then
Christopher lannella) and City Collector-Treasurer (then Lee Jackson) acting as ex-officio
members. 3 Mayor Flynn and BRA Director Coyle knew that the Trust would not only be
making decisions on linkage expenditures, but setting rules that would define the future direction
for the NHT. As a result, they made an effort to fill the Trust with City employees and people
loyal to the Mayor. Some of the early Trustees included the Mayor's Development Advisor,
Deputy Directors from the DND, the Parks and Recreation Director, Fair Housing Commissioner
and BRA Board members. 24
The first Chair of the NHT I was South Boston community activist Larry Dwyer. He was among
the first to join Flynn's mayoral campaign in 1983, and was rewarded by becoming one of the
first department heads appointed when Flynn took office, as executive director of the
Community Schools program. He went on to become Parks and Recreation Commissioner,
spent 18 months coordinating the integration of public housing for the Boston Housing
Authority, and was ultimately named the Commissioner of Health and Hospitals just before
Flynn left Boston for his position as U.S. Ambassador to the Vatican.
The NHT Ordinance of 1986 specified that the Trust would function under the rules and
regulations of the Declaration of Trust which was to be attached to the ordinance. In reality, the
Declaration did not get attached until one year later. Many of the rules and regulations were set
up with the intention of keeping control of the Trust closely held in City Hall. When asked about
control issues in the early NHT, one BRA employee recounted the story of Steve Coyle driving
to New Hampshire with his family for a much-needed vacation, having a brainstorm regarding
the rules and regulations for the newly formed NHT. He called his secretary from his cellular
23 Boston Redevelopment Authority. Linkage: Building Bridges of Opportunity, Affordable Homes and Jobs.
Winter 1988. P.3.
phone and started dictating what would become the official rules and regulations for the Trust.
After several miles driving as slowly as he could on the freeway, he drove out of range,
immediately taking the next exit and starting to drive back to Boston to finish the memo, to the
consternation of his understanding family in the back seat.25 This story seems to typify the
hands-on approach Steve Coyle took in setting up the Trust for Ray Flynn.
On September 3, 1987, the NHT filed a Declaration of Trust outlining its set of rules and
regulations. In the Declaration, the purpose of the Trust was stated as:
"Mitigating the extent to which Boston's low or moderate income households are
unable to afford decent, safe and sanitary housing within the City of Boston.
Towards that end the trust shall help to create and retain the supply of housing for
low or moderate income residents of the City of Boston..."
The NHT was to consist of seven Trustees: a City Councilor appointed by the President of the
City Council, the Collector-Treasurer and five Mayoral appointees. The Collector-Treasurer
serves as Managing Trustee and is responsible for maintaining the financial records and
administering the Trust. In addition, the Trustees appoint a Secretary, who cannot be one of the
five Trustees. The Secretary and any other employees the Trust deems necessary, work under
the supervision of the managing Trustee, with the only caveat that the Trust not spend over
$100,000 annually for salaries and administrative expenses, including the cost of an annual
independent audit.26
The limited budget for the Trust was a fiscally sound decision, but more importantly, was a way
for the Flynn administration to avoid building another large bureaucracy in City Hall. By
limiting the administrative budget, the Trust was forced to utilize existing City staff from the
BRA, PFD (now the DND), and Treasurer's office. Having City staff closely involved ensured
that the decisions being made were heavily influenced by City Hall. On several occasions, the
BRA discouraged developers from pursuing the housing creation option, urging cash payments
instead, enabling the BRA to work with housing developers of their choosing in order to craft
24 O'Malley, Tom. Boston Redevelopment Authority. Interview. June 9, 1999.
25 O'Malley, Tom. Interview. June 22, 1999.
26 The $100,000 number was to be adjusted periodically with the approval of the Boston City Council to account for
inflation.
proposals for submission to the NHT. The projects that were submitted in this fashion had the
blessing of the City staff and usually received approval from the NHT with very little problem.
On the surface, it would seem that this system (referred to as the "wink and a nod" system by
current City Hall employees) would have a high potential for abuse. In reality, the BRA and
DND staff were highly skilled professionals with maximizing quality affordable housing as their
primary goal. The reason they tried to control the proposal process was to maximize the
probability of accomplishing this end result. By guiding the process, not only did they achieve
quality affordable housing (several of the projects won awards for quality of design), but they
were able to craft partnerships that helped minorities gain access to the development community.
In order to formalize a working agreement between the NHT and the City departments, a
"Memorandum of Agreement" was signed between the DND, BRA and NHT on October 10,
1987, just a few weeks after the Declaration of Trust was approved. The memorandum outlined
the roles and responsibilities of the parties including:
* The Collector-Treasurer shall be responsible for management of the Trust funds, including
monitoring the repayment of funds from developers.
* The Trust shall designate either the BRA or DND to act on its behalf as Administering
Agency to oversee and carry out all aspects of the projects, except those responsibilities
specifically reserved for the Collector-Treasurer acting as Managing Trustee.
* The Administering Agency shall enter into housing payment agreements with developers
consistent with approvals granted by the Trust.
* The Administering Agency shall be responsible for seeking redress against any developer
that breaches their agreement.
* The Administering Agency shall be responsible for notifying the Collector-Treasurer of any
repayment plan for Trust funds.
* The Administering Agency shall be responsible for reporting annually on project activity for
both housing payment and housing creation options to the Trust.
The problem with the agreement was that it never identified which department would act as the
Administering Agency. Over the years, many of the tasks such as annual reports and
communication with the Collector-Treasurer were not completed, raising the possibility that the
Trust did not formally select an Administering Agency, and if they did, certainly did not demand
much from them.
Poor record keeping and organizational structure plagued the NHT I throughout its existence.
After Mayor Tom Menino took office in late 1993, BRA and DND staff started putting together
reports so the new BRA Director and other administrative heads could better understand the
linkage program. One of those reports, written in 1994, indicated that the NHT had not met for
over a year, which was in violation of the City Ordinance. In addition, all five of the Trustees
terms had been expired at the time of the report.27
In 1995, the BRA Director and Chief Financial Officer of the City of Boston initiated an internal
study of the NHT and NJT in order to review past management practices and recommend new
policies and procedures. They were anticipating the reduction of federal funding for job training
programs and the elimination of rent control in the City, which they believed would result in
increased demands, and therefore, increased scrutiny on the Trusts.
The final draft of the two-phase report was presented to BRA Director Marisa Lago on
December 23, 1996. Among the problems identified in the report was the fact that six separate
City departments were involved in the administrative and financial management of both funds,
yet communication and coordination were "sporadic at best", and had actually deteriorated over
the years.28 The report suggested that contributing factors to the decline in communication and
coordination were a change in mayoral administration, government restructuring, workforce
reductions and staff turnover. It also suggested that administrative policies and procedures were
apparently never formalized, which confirms my earlier statement about the Administering
Agency not being formally named in the Memorandum of Agreement. The study also
discovered that some key financial data and other trust-related documents were missing, making
the report difficult to complete, and further illuminating the difficulty of managing the NHT
under these conditions.
27 Memorandum to BRA Director Marissa Lago. May 23, 1994.
28 NHT/NJT Project Report. December 23, 1996.
In Phase I of the report, an audit was conducted on the NHT and NJT, identifying potential
delinquent linkage payments on 24 projects totaling as much as $4.03 million in housing linkage
alone. It was impossible to determine exact amounts, due to missing bank statements, building
permits and certificate of occupancy data. It was discovered that the NHT notes receivables
account had not been properly monitored due to a lack of formal procedures. The Phase I audit
concluded with the following recommendations:
* The Treasury Department must assume full financial management responsibility.
* Immediately start collection of past due payments.
* Take legal action against all developers who refuse to pay.
* For future payments, recommend that Treasury send invoices to developers at least two
weeks before linkage payment is due and follow-up with late notices and interest charges.
* All funds should be held and managed by City's Treasury Department. Treasury staff should
prepare invoices, follow-up with collection calls and prepare all NHT and NJT fiscal reports
on a quarterly basis.
* Trustees should not commit funds until cash is on hand.
* Reconcile NHT notes receivable, develop notes-related reporting procedures and establish
regular monitoring/review schedule.
* Initiate new management procedures.
Phase II of the report focused on operating policies and procedures of the Trusts. A step by step
review of existing procedures was performed, tracking a typical DIP agreement from inception to
the point when the developer began making the first linkage payment. They found that the first
breakdown in communication occurred after the BRA board approved the DIP agreement with
the developer. Because staff were not formally assigned to this area, nobody communicated to
other departments the fact that a DIP agreement had just been signed. If someone in the
Treasury office did somehow find out about the DIP agreement, there was nobody in that office
assigned the responsibility to invoice developers and collect linkage payments. The Treasury
office could not send out an invoice until the developer got an approved building permit from the
Inspection Services Department (ISD). Unfortunately, ISD staff were not aware of DIP
agreements and did not have a system in place for making sure developers were up to speed on
their linkage payments before issuing occupancy permits.
Phase II of the report also indicated that the NHT had not had an official meeting for several
years. Without any one department in charge, and a Trust that was not meeting regularly, it is
easy to understand how these organizational problems could occur. It should be noted that the
NJT did not have as many organizational problems because they contracted annually with the
Jobs and Community Services (JCS) Department of EDIC to administer and staff the NJT.
The Phase II review concluded with the following recommendations:
* Appoint a NHT and NJT Linkage Management Team, selecting staff persons from Treasury,
BRA/EDIC, DND, JCS and ISD. The team will meet quarterly and be led by a Treasury
Department representative.
* Initiate a NHT meeting, fill vacant Trustee positions and establish formal Trustee protocol,
including: meeting minutes, votes and financial reports.
* Revise the "standard" DIP agreement package so the terms and conditions clearly state the
developer responsibilities for linkage. One suggestion was to include a Treasury Release
Form which must be completed by the developer and presented to Treasury prior to applying
for building and/or certificate of occupancy permits.
* The BRA representative on the Linkage Management team shall be responsible to
communicate executed DIP agreements and amendments of DIP agreements to the rest of the
management team within two weeks of the BRA board vote.
* The Treasury representative shall be responsible for collecting linkage payments, signing off
on Treasury Release Forms, invoicing for future linkage payments, and preparing NHT and
NJT financial status reports. Treasury will continue to pay invoices from affordable housing
developers.
* The DND representative shall be responsible for staffing the NHT and preparing all
neighborhood affordable housing disbursement packages. This person would be responsible
for preparation of NHT minutes, votes, correspondence and working with Treasury to
prepare NHT financial reports.
* The JCS representative would continue to be responsible for staffing the NJT.
The ISD representative would be responsible for verifying receipt of the Treasury Release
Form, signed off by Treasury, before issuing building and/or certificate of occupancy permits
on all DIP projects.
In addition to these recommendations, the report suggested three other options including
managing the communication through the city MIS infrastructure, assigning all NHT and NJT
administrative responsibilities to one department, and requiring developers to make all of their
linkage payments up front to avoid the extensive paperwork the current system requires.
Despite these problems, The NHT I managed to approve $40.5 million in linkage money towards
the creation of 3,278 units of affordable housing between 1986 and 1995. The philosophy of
the Trust seemed to be geared towards being the first money into a project, giving incentives for
the State and Federal agencies and other private finance sources to follow suit.29 This fits the
model described earlier where the BRA staff crafted development projects with the housing
developers, using linkage as an incentive. Over the ten year period, the average subsidy per
affordable unit was $17,097 which represented 13.9 percent of the total development costs on
those projects (Table 3-1).30
Year of Number Total Number of Subsidy Total Percentage
NHT of Dollars Affordable Per Development Of Development
Approval Projects Awarded Units Unit Costs Costs Notes
1986 1 $ 450,000 18 $ 25,000 $ 4,000,000 11.3%
1987 7 $ 7,810,138 1,339 $ 5,833 $ 139,920,672 5.6%
1988 11 $ 8,560,274 343 $ 24,957 $ 50,541,299 16.9%
1989 14 $ 10,211,625 689 $ 14,821 $ 81,249,135 12.6%
1990 5 $ 3,814,800 198 $ 19,267 $ 22,465,320 17.0%
1991 12 $ 4,517,020 355 $ 12,724 $ 96,763,213 4.7%
1992 4 $ 2,639,900 119 $ 22,184 $ 19,947,945 13.2% TDC were not available for 2 projects
1993 2 $ 225,000 21 $ 10,714 $ 712,108 31.6% TDC were not available for 1 project
1994 2 $ 1,325,871 45 $ 29,464 $ 7,200,000 18.4% TDC were not available for 1 project
1995 2 $ 907,000 151 $ 6,007 $ 10,974,784 8.3%
Totals 60 $40,461,628 3,278 $ 17,097 $ 433,774,476 13.9%
Table 3-1: NHT I Linkage Housing Awards by Year
Source: City of Boston, Department of Neighborhood Development and Boston Redevelopment Authority
29 Canavan, Patricia. Special Assistant to the Mayor for Housing Policy. Interview. June 24, 1999.
30 These numbers must be treated as rough estimates since records from this period are incomplete. Total
development costs are missing from four projects between 1992 and 1994 which would lower the average
percentage of development costs below 13.9 percent.
1989 was the most active year of linkage awards for the NHT I. One of the approved projects
was Parmelee Court in the South End neighborhood. The BRA designated York Bay, a newly
formed minority developer in Boston, to develop 74 units of mixed-income housing on two
adjacent BRA parcels within the guidelines of the SENHI program. 31 The design of the
Parmalee Court Homes responded to the historical context of the site while maintaining 51
affordable units, ranging from one-to four-bedrooms, with some handicap accessible. The
$1,057,000 linkage award, linked from Gerald D. Hines' development at 500 Boylston Street,
represented 8.9 percent of the total development cost for the project. Initially, the linkage award
was approved at $815,000, but after the linkage securitization process through Met Life and
Prudential Insurance companies, additional money was made available for several affordable
housing projects. The Parmalee Court project was typical of NHT I awards in the way it was
carefully crafted and led through the process by the BRA. In addition, the BRA was able to
promote the involvement of a minority developer.32
The NHT I approved three linkage awards in South Boston between 1986 and 1995, including
O'Reilly School, Monsignor Lyons, and South Boston CDC. The renovation of the John Boyle
O'Reilly School was the third linkage award given out by the NHT I on June 18, 1987. The 32
unit elderly housing project was developed by the National Association of Government
Employees (NAGE). The original school was a classical revival style brick building, built in
1905. All of the units were designed to be either studio or one-bedroom, and were affordable to
low-income, elderly tenants. The $305,000 linkage award, linked from the Druker Company's
Heritage on the Garden project in downtown Boston, represented 10.9 percent of the total
development cost for the project.33
The NHT I was not particularly good about producing annual reports for many of the reasons
outlined above. On two occasions, however, the BRA produced documents that were a cross
between an annual report for the NHT and a public relations tool ("Mayoral Fluff Piece"
according to one BRA staffer) selling the idea of linkage to the masses. One of the reports was
31 The South End Neighborhood Housing Initiative was a grass roots effort to develop affordable housing on vacant
city-owned land acquired during the Urban Renewal Program.
32 Boston Neighborhood Housing Trust. Linkage: Building Affordable Homes. Special Report. 1989.
33 Ibid.
produced in 1988, the other in 1989.34 The most interesting feature of these documents was the
attempt to make a connection between the commercial development project that created the
linkage money, and the affordable housing project that received the money. The BRA used
aerial photography and mapping to illustrate the "link" between development projects, and every
affordable housing project description mentioned the building from which the linkage money
came. After the real estate economy tanked in late 1989, there was little incentive to produce
documents on linkage. By the time annual reports started being produced again in the late
1990's, the idea of linking the commercial development with the housing development was gone.
For example, the NHT annual report for 1998 has detailed descriptions of the affordable housing
projects being created, but no mention of the commercial development that made them possible.
Neighborhood Housing Trust II (1996 - Present)
In December of 1995, Patricia Canavan was hired as Special Assistant to the Mayor for Housing
Policy. One of the first tasks assigned by Mayor Menino was the job of getting the NHT running
smoothly once again. In contrast to Ray Flynn, Mayor Menino wanted the Trustees to be from
outside of City Hall. Canavan wanted Trustees with housing experience and a concern for
Boston's neighborhoods. She expected to find a number of candidates from within the numerous
neighborhood Community Development Corporations (CDC) with which she had previously
worked. To her surprise, the boards of those development corporations did not want their staff or
board members to become Trustees on the NHT because they feared conflict of interest
problems. They preferred to be the developers of projects requesting funding from the Trust
rather than influencing which neighborhoods the money would be spent in.
After changing her focus from requiring housing experience to requiring people with a track
record of community involvement, a shortlist of names was presented to Mayor Menino, and the
following five Trustees were selected:35
* Watchen H. Barker, Dorchester. Currently a home loan officer with Fleet Bank and actively
involved in her Dorchester neighborhood.
34 For some reason, many documents from the NHT I era were not dated, so 1989 is my best guess based on what
was written in the report.
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* Reverend Craig W. McMullen, Dorchester. Currently a Minister at Dorchester Temple
Baptist Church. He helped reinvigorate the congregation of the Church and has a reputation
for reaching out to people in need. He is also active in several community groups.
* Mary R. Soo Hoo, Chinatown. She is a restaurant owner and very active in her community.
* Clayton Turnbull, Dorchester. He owns several fast food restaurant franchises. He is a
member of the Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative (currently President of the
organization) and is very involved in his community.
* Jose A. Vincenty, Jamaica Plain. Jose ran for City Council a few years back and was seen as
a potential "up-and-comer" in Boston politics. He is very active in Boston's Hispanic
community, and works as a staff member for a State Representative.
The Trustees were brought on board in the Fall of 1996, and elected Clayton Turnbull as their
Chair. They proceeded to have several visioning meetings where they attempted to find a focus
for the expenditure of linkage money. For the first year, they decided to focus on stabilization of
the existing stock of affordable housing by investing in rehabilitation and preservation projects.
If NHT I was the first money into projects, NHT II's first round of linkage distributions could
best be characterized as the last money into projects. Working with DND, the Trust issued a
request for proposals from housing developers and approved seven projects in 1997 for a linkage
award total of $2.68 million. Six projects eventually were completed generating work on 820
units of affordable housing for a linkage subsidy of $3,262 per unit, or 4.8 percent of total
development costs (Table 3-2). After its first two years of operation, the NHT II has contributed
an average subsidy of $31,131 per affordable unit, representing 18.3 percent of total
development costs.
Year of Number Total Number of Subsidy Total Percentage
NHT of Dollars Affordable Per Development Of Development
Approval Projects Awarded Units Unit Costs Costs Notes
1996 0 $ - - $ - $ - 0.0% No NHT activity in1996
1997 7 $ 2,675,000 820* $ 3,262 $ 55,633,723 4.8% 95 New Units Created
1998 3 $ 1 593,000 27 $ 59~000 $ 4,997,651 31.9% Beginning of Home Again
Totals 10 $4,268,000 847 $ 31,131 $60,631,374 18.3%
Table 3-2: NHT II Linkage Housing Awards by Year
Source: City of Boston Mayor's Housing Advisor and Boston Redevelopment Authority
35 The information about the Trustees was provided by Patricia Canavan and Clayton Turnbull.
In evaluating the first two-year term of the NHT II (all five Trustees were re-appointed for a
second two-year term ending January 1, 2000), Patricia Canavan thought the lack of housing
experience on the Trust caused a few minor problems, but they worked through them. In her
opinion, the Trust was very design conscious and concerned about community input and the
impacts of development on adjacent neighborhoods. Clayton Turnbull reiterated Canavan's
opinion about design quality, saying that just because it is affordable, does not mean it has to be
poor quality. In Turnbull's opinion, the Trust is pickier about design quality than the DND staff,
which at times can create tension when a developer thinks they have a completed deal because
DND gave a preliminary approval, and the Trust starts requesting changes to the design.36
The number of "new" affordable units created under the 1997 program was only 95, with most of
the effort on rehabilitating existing affordable units. For example, the Mishawum Park
Apartments project in Charlestown was a 337 unit, 20 building development built in 1973. It
was considered an "expiring use" development, meaning that the original developers received
funding in 1973 that required them to keep the apartments affordable for 25 years. In September
of 1997, the Mishawum Park Tenants Association, Inc. acquired the property from the original
owner and became one of the only tenant organizations in the country to purchase an expiring
use property without the benefit of a non-profit sponsor. The $500,000 in linkage money,
representing just 1.6 percent of the total development cost, was one out of ten sources of funding
that the tenants association received. It was primarily used for addressing numerous structural
and code deficiencies and ensuring more efficient future operations. 37
Another of the $500,000 linkage awards for 1997 went to the South End Tenants Housing II
project located in the South End neighborhood. It is a 184 unit, scattered site development
including 25 historically significant brick row houses. The buildings were all subsidized after
renovations in the early 1970's. The linkage money was the only significant source of outside
funding and was used for updating mechanical and roof systems, replacing kitchens and
bathrooms, and bringing the development up to current building and health codes.
36 Clayton Turnbull. Chair of NHT II. Interview. July 1, 1999.
37 City of Boston Neighborhood Housing Trust Annual Report. 1998.
The 1997 round of linkage awards highlighted parts of the linkage process in City Hall that were
still not working smoothly.38 As a result, the NHT leadership and City staff started focusing on
operational issues. According to the NHT 1998 annual report, they "improved the operations of
the Trust by taking the time to update documents, establish clear lines of communication with
City agencies, and refined accounting procedures to improve the tracking and collecting of
payments due the trust". According to Chair Clayton Turnbull, it was very difficult sorting
through the records and trying to piece together what really happened. "It is not even clear that
the NHT I voted for several of the projects completed with linkage money between 1986 and
1995". 39
Paul Santanna, a Senior Project Manager for DND and liason to the NHT II, suggested that the
biggest improvements in the linkage process so far have been in the documentation. The process
has become more organized with forms and requisitions designed specifically to make the
linkage process flow more smoothly. The process is working much better in the areas of linkage
collections from developers and linkage awards from the NHT to affordable housing developers.
Paul felt there was still room for improvement on inter-departmental communication and process
issues. For example, ISD is still not integrated into the linkage loop within City Hall. When
asked about the linkage management committee suggested as part of the 1996 report, Paul
indicated that a group of people from various departments meet occasionally to discuss linkage
issues. In addition, Tony Marinello, the BRA finance officer who co-authored the report, has
been informally acting as the linkage coordinator by virtue of the fact that he is aware of DIP
agreements and attends NHT II meetings.4
After the completion of linkage awards in 1997, the Trustees had another round of visioning
meetings to determine their next focus. In those meetings, they expressed a desire to see more
tangible evidence of their investments than, for example, a new mechanical system. They also
determined that they wanted to maximize their impact by looking for projects that would "spark"
other development in troubled neighborhoods. About that time, Mayor Menino approached the
Trust with an idea for creating new home ownership opportunities on vacant city-owned lots.
38 Santanna, Paul. Department of Neighborhood Development. Interview. July 8, 1999.
39 Turnbull, Clayton. Chair of NHT II. Interview. July 1, 1999.
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After much discussion, the Trust approved an allocation of $3 million for the "Home Again"
program for developing single family homes on vacant city lots. In addition to the linkage
money, Mayor Menino committed the City's support to Home Again developments including
technical assistance, environmental site assessments, and discounted land acquisition.
The first project approved under the Home Again program was the Bowdoin/Geneva project
sponsored by the Dorchester Housing Action Team (DHAT). A community planning process in
the Clarkson/Coleman/Hamilton area of Dorchester identified seven city-owned lots that could
best complement rehabilitation work underway in the community, and also determined the best
housing development alternatives. The linkage award will help provide seven three-bedroom,
energy efficient, single-family homes with wrap-around porches. The $400,000 linkage award
represents the only grant money the project will receive, representing 32.7 percent of the total
development cost.41
The Woodward Park II development was a partnership with the Dudley Street Neighborhood
Initiative (DSNI), involving the new construction of eight single family homes and four duplexes
on vacant city-owned land and some private land in the Dudley Triangle. This project
represented the fifth development in the buildout of the Dudley Triangle since 1990. The
$780,000 linkage award represents the only grant money the project will receive, representing
32.5 percent of the total development cost. 42
The last Home Again project approved in 1998 was the Goodale Road New Housing Initiative,
resulting from the efforts of the Mattapan Civic Improvement Association (MCIA). The City
and the MCIA, working with the community, chose sites for affordable housing that they thought
would generate maximum neighborhood benefit. They focused on several vacant parcels in the
Wellington Hill area of Mattapan. A total of five three-story modular buildings are being
developed with an owners unit and rental unit in each one. The $423,000 linkage award
40 Santanna, Paul. Interview. July 8, 1999.
41 City of Boston Neighborhood Housing Trust Annual Report. 1998.
42 Ibid.
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represents the only grant money the project will receive, representing 30 percent of the total
development cost.43
Total linkage expenditures on the Home Again program for 1998 were $1.6 million, creating 27
units of affordable housing, a subsidy of $59,000 per unit, leaving approximately $1.4 million for
use in 1999. At the NHT meeting of July 1, 1999, most of the remaining Home Again fund was
allocated to the Mission Hill New Housing Initiative for the construction of 16 homeownership
units and six rental units located on vacant city-owned parcels in the Back of the Hill
neighborhood of Mission Hill. The Trust invested $1,220,267 for a subsidy of $55,466 per unit,
equaling 34 percent of total development costs.
Typical NHT II Linkage A ward process
After the Home Again concept was approved on May 13, 1998, the NHT worked with the BRA
and DND to identify ten sites owned by the city, which would be appropriate to construct several
single family, two family, and/or duplex style homes. As noted earlier, the NHT also required
that these sites be in locations that would potentially spur further development in the surrounding
neighborhood. One of the sites on the list was especially easy to identify since the Back of the
Hill neighborhood had already been meeting for months in an effort to determine what to do with
the City's vacant lots in their neighborhood. DND staff had been working with the neighborhood
and knew there was support for an affordable housing project.
DND prepared a "boiler plate" request for proposals (RFP) and submitted it to the Back of the
Hill neighborhood for review. With community approval in hand, DND issued the RFP in
February of 1999, asking for-profit and non-profit developers to submit proposals for the
development of high quality, affordable housing on previously identified vacant, city-owned
parcels in the Back of the Hill neighborhood of Mission Hill. Two developers responded to the
RFP including the joint venture of Back of the Hill Community Development
Corporation/Neighborhood Development Corporation of Jamaica Plain and a for-profit
developer, Baran Partners, LLC.
43 City of Boston Neighborhood Housing Trust Annual Report. 1998.
_ __ _I_ __I_
Five DND staff members reviewed the proposals and scored them according to the department's
criteria. DND then hosted a community meeting with both developers making their best pitch to
the neighborhood. The community preference and the DND scoring both pointed to the non-
profit joint venture as the developer of choice. DND put together a packet of information and
sent it to the NHT Trustees in advance of their July 1, 1999 Trustees meeting, marking the first
time Trustees got directly involved with the process. At the NHT meeting on July 1, a DND
staff member assigned to the project introduced the development team and recommended
approval of the $1,220,267 grant request. After a brief presentation by the developer, the
Trustees approved the project without discussion. After the meeting, the DND representative to
the Trust recorded the vote and sent an award letter to the grantee, formally ending the Trust's
involvement with the project.
As part of the NHT vote of approval for the development, the Trustees formally recognized the
DND as Administering Agency for the project. According to Paul Santanna, DND staff person
for the Trust, DND was officially recognized as the Administering Agency in 1996, but the
Trustees clarify that fact with every linkage award vote. This is another example of the
administrative changes that have been made since the 1996 internal linkage report was released.
Relationship to South Boston Betterment Trust
When asked about control issues between the Mayor and the Trust, Patricia Canavan indicated
that the Trustees had to be supportive of the Mayor to get on the Trust, but once on, have been
very independent thinkers.44 As Clayton Turnbull describes it, "We are volunteers spending time
away from our families, doing something that we hope is good for the entire city. Some day, I
want to be able to drive by these housing projects with my son and say, this is why I spent those
nights away from home, and feel good about it." 45 The fact that they are all volunteers without
strong connections to City Hall gives the Trust a special license to go about its tasks and let the
politics swirl around it, yet remain unaffected.
44 Canavan, Patricia. Special Assistant to the Mayor for Housing Policy. Interview. June 24, 1999.
45 Turnbull, Clayton. Chair of NHT II. Interview. July 1, 1999.
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While Turnbull was disappointed at not being informed about the Memorandum of
Understanding between the BRA and South Boston leaders, he shrugged it off as something that
does not really affect the NHT. In fact, none of the Trust members, including secretary Canavan
or DND representative Paul Santanna, had even seen the MOU document. To Turnbull, the
question for South Boston shouldn't be how much are we going to get, but rather where are we
going to put it?4 This was in reference to the repeated demands that more than half of all
linkage money from the Seaport go to the traditional South Boston community, when in reality,
there are very few developable sites in South Boston. He pointed to the Millennium project in
Chinatown as an example of how the Trust looks at linkage proposals from impacted
neighborhoods. Earlier this year, the Millennium development group came to the NHT II
requesting that its linkage money be earmarked specifically for Chinatown. Despite the fact that
one of the Trust members was from Chinatown and it was very aware of the impacts the
neighborhood was feeling, the Trust voted no to the request, insisting that the developer or
neighborhood have an actual project in hand when requesting linkage money.
Turnbull's biggest concern about the MOU is that somehow the SBBT will expect a certain
amount of money to be "set aside" for future projects instead of allowing money to be spent
today on good projects that are ready to be built. He is afraid that if the City waits too long, the
very people they are trying to help will have moved out of the city because it is unaffordable.
Lessons Learned
The NHT II is in its fourth year of operation since Mayor Menino gave it new life in 1996.
Separated from NHT I by a major real estate collapse, a new administration, an internal audit,
and an external review by the Boston Municipal Research Bureau, NHT II might be seen as the
second round of linkage in Boston, making it a good indicator of what lessons the City learned
(or not) about linkage in the first round.
46 Turnbull, Clayton. NHT II Chair. Interview. July 1, 1999.
Management
One of the most important lessons the City learned is that when the economy is good, people
start paying attention to linkage. The Boston Municipal Research Bureau (BMRB) published a
study in October of 1998, following 16 months of research, highlighting many of the
management problems with the linkage program.47 Prior to the release of the BMRB report,
several procedural changes were in progress, such as improvements to linkage documents,
collection procedures, payment procedures and inter-departmental communication. Ed Collins,
Managing Trustee of the NHT II and CFO of the City, apparently determined that much of the
management problem with linkage centered around the housing creation option and linkage
loans. As a result, he has been a proponent of avoiding the housing creation option whenever
possible and eliminating linkage loans in favor of grants.4
Control
One of the major differences between NHT I and NHT II is the issue of control. NHT I was
controlled by the BRA, with most of the Trustees being City Hall insiders. NHT II, on the other
hand, is a diverse group of people representing a broad cross-section of Boston's neighborhoods
and ethnic communities, being "guided" by the DND. This change in strategy between the Flynn
and Menino administrations could be the result of an overreaction to the internal report of 1996,
indicating problems in the operation, organization and management of the linkage program.
Instead of fixing the parts of the linkage vehicle that were not working, the Menino
administration apparently decided to replace the engine.
Another reason for the shift in control between administrations could have been the result of a
perception in City Hall that the NHT I was not a fair system of awarding linkage money. The
majority of linkage funds were allocated to the South End and Roxbury where the BRA owned
the most land, resulting in a feeling that not everyone had equal access to the housing funds
(Figure 3-3). As one City Hall employee stated, "Openness did not exist in the BRA system." It
is interesting to note that DND now plays the role that the BRA played, putting together
47 The Boston Municipal Research Bureau is a nonprofit, member-supported research organization established in
1932 to study Boston's fiscal, management and administrative problems.
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affordable housing projects and bringing them to the NHT II for approval. Although, the NHT II
plays a bigger role in defining a "vision" for how to spend the linkage money, some of the
Trustees still complained after the 1997 funding round that the DND was "controlling" too much
of the process. One DND employee stated that "the Trustees seem to act independent of city
housing issues, trying to set their own agenda." This statement is probably the best indication of
how the NHT has changed under the Menino administration.
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Figure 3-3: NHT I Distribution of Housing Linkage Spending
Source: City of Boston Mayor's Housing Advisor, Department of Neighborhood Development,
And the Boston Redevelopment Authority
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Geographic Distribution of Linkage Funds
On February 6, 1986, Article 26A was amended to the Boston Zoning ordinance adding (among
other changes) the idea that with every commercial development where linkage money is
created, one neighborhood will be impacted more than others. The assumption was that areas
adjacent to commercial development would be the most "impacted neighborhoods," and
therefore should be guaranteed a small percentage of the linkage money taken from the
commercial development. If the commercial development was taking place in the downtown
area, ten percent of the linkage award was to be set aside for the "impacted neighborhood." If
the commercial development was taking place outside of downtown, 20 percent was set aside for
the "impacted neighborhood." In both cases, the money reserved for the impacted neighborhood
was dependent on the NHT finding feasible affordable housing projects in that area.
It is not evident from past records that the NHT I made linkage awards with Article 26A in mind,
but there was a very clear link made between the commercial development and the housing
development beneficiary. NHT II seems to have dropped any connection between the
commercial and housing developments. In addition, there has been no focus whatsoever on the
issue of geographic distribution. According to Paul Santanna and Patricia Canavan, the Trust has
been busy focusing on other priorities, and at some point will have to deal with the issue of
geographic distribution. NHT II Chair Clayton Turnbull has taken the approach that geography
does not matter when it comes to affordable housing. He is just as happy at a ribbon cutting in
Charlestown as he is in his Dorchester neighborhood. He is aware of the Article 26A rule, but
also believes that the priority has to be creating affordable housing projects now, not waiting
several years until land becomes available in an "impacted neighborhood."
Leveraging Linkage
One of the surprises of my research is the fact that linkage money has been leveraged less in
1998 and 1999 than in the past 14 years. I expected that with the BRA tightly controlling the
process during the first ten years, there would have been a tendency to throw large sums of
linkage money at pet projects. In fact, the City did quite well over the entire NHT I span,
leveraging linkage money with many other funding sources. Between 1986 and 1995, the
average percentage of development costs paid from linkage funds was 13.9 percent.49 NHT II is
a little more difficult to analyze because it is only on its third year of granting linkage awards,
and has taken two different approaches. In 1997, Trustees were still getting their feet wet, and
decided to fund various rehabilitation and preservation projects where there were several other
sources of funding as well. Projects funded in 1997 received on average 4.8 percent of their total
development costs in the form of linkage grants. The Home Again program, which the NHT II
adopted in 1998, has taken a new approach towards leveraging linkage money. The Home Again
projects are receiving on average, 32 percent of their funding through the linkage program.
It is not an accident that the linkage subsidy has gone from $3,262 per unit to over $59,000 per
unit in one year. The Trustees were looking for a way to put their "stamp" on something
original, the Mayor had vacant lots strewn about the city, and neighborhoods wanted single
family homes on those lots. The DND staff were encouraging the Trustees to take ownership of
an idea, but at the same time, reminding them that they need to support the Mayor's housing
goals. When all of those pieces were put together, the Home Again project became a logical
choice, regardless of the cost in linkage dollars. When asked about the $59,000 per unit subsidy,
Paul Santanna explained that the value of linkage is its "flexibility." For example, if they used
DND funds, the contractors would have to pay prevailing wage, but with linkage money, no such
strings are attached. Even though the City promotes the payment of prevailing wage, when it
comes to building affordable housing, keeping cost down is the primary concern.
Ironically, it is the "flexibility" of linkage funds that the South Boston Betterment Trust is
banking on as it eagerly awaits its first payment from the South Boston Seaport development.
When asked recently about building affordable housing in South Boston, Council President
Kelly stated:
"I don't want the BRA building this housing. I don't want the City building this
housing. I don't want the state or federal government building this housing,
because I don't want the strings that are attached to those subsidies. What I want
is housing for South Boston people. That does not mean I intend to exclude
anyone. But let's get our house in order."'
49 This number would actually be smaller, but four projects between 1992 and 1994 were missing total development
cost numbers in the City records that I reviewed.
50 This quote was taken from an article published on the www.Southbostononline.com web site.
Chapter Four: South Boston Betterment Trust
"I'll be honest with you, I work for the people of South Boston. I don't want to see
them displaced. I'm not sure there's a mechanism in place I could trust as much as
the South Boston Betterment Trust."
James Kelly, April 22, 1999
Boston Herald
Background
On March 11, 1998, the Boston City Council approved the construction of a Convention
Center in the heart of the South Boston Seaport district. Leading up to the vote, the
discussion focused heavily on what mitigation would be provided for the impacted South
Boston neighborhood. Council President James Kelly and his contingent of South Boston
leaders, including State Senator Stephen Lynch and Representative Jack Hart, knew they
were in a position of power since the State had placed a March 11, 1998 deadline on the
vote. They also knew how much Mayor Menino wanted that Convention Center as the
legacy of his administration. Kelly controlled enough votes on the City Council to delay
the proceedings unless the City agreed to specific terms that were important to the South
Boston Community.
After weeks of posturing and negotiating, a deal was struck that would give Mayor
Menino his Convention Center and the South Boston community their claim to linkage
money from the Seaport development. Article 5.2 of the March 11, 1998 City Council
Order states:
"Not withstanding the developer of, or the location of, the headquarters
Hotel, all of the housing and jobs linkage deriving from the development
of the Headquarters Hotel shall, through the Neighborhood Housing Trust
and the Neighborhood Jobs Trust respectively, be for the benefit of
residents of the Impacted Neighborhood, to be expended for the purposes
of developing affordable housing in, and promoting the job training and
employment for the residents of, the Impacted Neighborhood."
Through Article 5.2, the City Council took the job of allocating linkage money from the
Convention Center headquarters Hotel out of the direct control of the NHT. This
happened at the same time the NHT was articulating to other developers in other
neighborhoods that they would not approve "geographic linkage commitments" unless
there were specific project proposals on the table.
In addition to the specific requirements outlined in the Council Order, a Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) was signed between BRA Director Tom O'Brien and South
Boston leaders James M. Kelly, Stephen F. Lynch and Jack A. Hart, Jr. on March 11,
1998 (see appendix). As Article 5.2 articulated the linkage process for the Convention
Center hotel, the MOU articulated what would happen with all of the remaining
development in the entire Seaport for an indefinite period of time. As with the Council
Order, the NHT was not consulted about the details of this agreement.
Among the terms promised as part of the memorandum were:
* No less than the majority of job linkage from the Seaport will be allocated to the
South Boston neighborhood.
* No less than the majority of housing linkage from the Seaport will be allocated to the
South Boston neighborhood.
* Within 180 days, the BRA shall identify parcels of land available in South Boston for
the development of affordable single and multi-family housing.
* The BRA shall use its best efforts to encourage developers to purchase available sites
in South Boston on behalf of the South Boston Betterment Trust.
* The BRA shall petition the Boston Zoning Commission to establish in the Seaport
District a maximum as-of-right building height of 150 feet. If developers want to
exceed 150 feet, they will have to complete a community review process and execute
a written agreement obligating them to pay certain benefits to the neighborhood in
addition to the base linkage payments.
Article 3.1 of the MOU states:
"The BRA, working with the Neighborhood Housing Trust, shall establish
an annual aggregate goal of allocating no less than a majority of housing
linkage deriving from development within the Seaport District pursuant to
Article 26A of the Boston Zoning Code, as a community benefit to
residents of the impacted neighborhood, for the purposes of developing
affordable housing in the impacted neighborhood and assisting senior
citizens, first time homebuyers and others who are residents therein with
their housing needs."
Article 3.1 is relatively clear in making a reference to Article 26A of the Boston Zoning
Code, which suggests that the only change to the regular linkage procedure is that the
agreement would increase the "Housing Contribution Grant" to the Impacted
Neighborhood from the required 20 percent to more than 50 percent for this special case.
Of course, it is not this simple because in the eighth WHEREAS of the MOU, it states:
"WHEREAS, the parties hereto have deemed it to be in the public interest
that there shall be established a charitable organization to be known as the
South Boston Betterment Trust (the "Trust") pursuant to Massachusetts
General Laws c. 180 and Section 501c(3) of the Internal Revenue Code,
the directors of which shall be residents of South Boston (including but
not limited to its elected officials and other neighborhood leaders),
selected by such officials and leaders, which Trust shall, in perpetuity, be
the beneficiary of community benefits established pursuant to this MOU
or to any agreements related to development in the Seaport District."
This paragraph brings about a sense of ambiguity and mystery that the South Boston
Betterment Trust (SBBT) has thrived on since its inception. Although Article 3.1 of the
MOU makes it clear that the NHT will be approving linkage awards for South Boston,
this paragraph suggests that those linkage awards as well as any other agreement related
to development in the Seaport will be dedicated directly to the SBBT to distribute
according to their wishes.
Trust Membership
The SBBT consists of 15 Trustees, with three each appointed by Council President James
Kelly, State Representative Jack Hart, State Senator Stephan Lynch, U.S. Congressman
Joe Moakley, and Mayor Tom Menino. Despite the confidentiality surrounding the
Trust, I was able to determine the identity of the Trustees through third-party sources.
They are Bill Bailey, John Ciccone, Debbie DiMaggio, Bill McDonough, Tom Tinlin,
Mary Binda, Mary Ann Crush, Arthur Fritch, Brian Miller, Harry Uhlman, Fr. Richard
Cannon, Fr. John Cullory, Manny Gregorio, Joe Nee, and Susan Woods.
Mary Ann Crush has been elected (or appointed) the first Chair of the Trust. She is a
supporter of Councilor Kelly, but is best known as the person who redefined real estate in
South Boston by marketing the area to "outsiders." According to some community
residents, Mary Ann helped people realize the value of converting triple-deckers into
condos, which changed the longstanding tradition of Southies only renting or selling to
other Southies.1
At least three members of the Trust have direct ties to the South Boston Information
Center, founded by James Kelly during the busing crisis in the mid 1970's, and the
majority are residents of the "Upper End" or City Point area of South Boston. Keeping
with tradition, two members of the Trust are Catholic priests. Other than Father Cannon,
a new priest at St. Vincent's Church, it is unclear if any of the Trustees live in either the
St. Vincent's, Andrew Square or Fort Point Channel neighborhoods, despite the fact that
these are the neighborhoods most impacted by Seaport development, and have the
poorest population. Several residents I spoke to expressed a concern regarding the
makeup of the Trust being so heavily in favor of the Upper End of the community.
Others are concerned about the lack of transparency on the SBBT. As one St. Vincent's
neighborhood resident put it,
"I know what the rules are for the NHT, but what are the rules for the
SBBT? They are supposedly speaking for the entire South Boston
community, yet we do not know who the Trustees are."
Role of the South Boston Betterment Trust
Sixteen months after the MOU officially announcing the formation of the SBBT,
ambiguity over the role of the Trust seems to linger. In fact, members of the NHT,
'Gelzinis, Peter. Boston Herald Columnist and South Boston resident. Interview. July 1, 1999.
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including the Chair, the Secretary, and the DND representative, have not even seen the
MOU relegating the majority of linkage money away from the NHT to the South Boston
community. Some City officials shrug off concerns about the SBBT and suggest that it is
just another form of a community group organized for the purpose of negotiating
"community benefits" or "linkage on top of linkage" beyond the amount required in the
City Zoning Ordinance.2 In their opinion, nothing will change other than the percentage
of linkage allocated by the NHT to the South Boston community (Figure 4-la). Some
City officials imagine 100 percent of the linkage generated from the Seaport Hotel
construction being funneled through the NHT directly to the SBBT. In addition, 51
percent of linkage from Seaport DIPs would be funneled through the NHT to the SBBT.
Finally, the SBBT would "unofficially" negotiate for community benefits directly with
2 "Community Benefits" and Linkage on Top of Linkage" are both terms used to describe exactions from
developers beyond what is required by the City Zoning Ordinance.
the developers of Seaport projects. This scenario is legal under the current City Zoning
Ordinance, but the likelihood of the current NHT voting to allocate money to the SBBT
without specific projects in hand is very low, based on Trustee comments and past
precedent with the Millennium project in Chinatown.
The South Boston community has a much different opinion about how the SBBT will be
utilized. During the recent debate over the amount of housing to be built in the Seaport
area, Councilor Kelly explained that
"half the linkage money from commercial development in the district goes
to the South Boston Betterment Trust, which could build its own housing
in the neighborhood... There's no linkage money in residential, so the
Betterment Trust gets more if there's more commercial development." 3
In an earlier conversation, Kelly expressed his unhappiness with the way the BRA would
go about picking sites and securing funds from developers for affordable housing. He
insisted that all payments for housing and job creation be administered only through the
SBBT.
"The responsibility of building housing (in South Boston) falls on the
Betterment Trust, not the BRA. And I wish the BRA would understand
that," Kelly said. "They risk alienating the whole neighborhood."4
These statements make it seem that Councilor Kelly expects money to go directly into the
SBBT without ever passing through the NHT (Figure 4-1b). It appears Kelly wants 100
percent of the linkage from the Seaport Hotel dedicated directly to the SBBT, 100 percent
of community benefits negotiated with the developer going directly into the SBBT, and
51 percent of linkage from Seaport DIPs going into the SBBT. Even though this is an
enticing scenario for South Boston, it cannot happen without legislative change, and
therefore, is not likely to happen.
It is not surprising that City officials remain aloof about the SBBT. After all, the Trust
has been formed by the President of the City Council, who is typically not challenged.
One person that did question the role of the SBBT was Boston Herald columnist Peter
3 Cohen, Rachelle. Boston Herald. April 22, 1999.
4 Macero, Cosmo Jr. Boston Herald. November 12, 1998.
Gelzinis. In his April 13, 1999 column, Southie native Gelzinis suggested that James
Kelly has never been concerned about affordable housing in South Boston because
"affordable housing equals subsidized housing and subsidized housing equals a few
mandated 'set asides' for low-income people who may not look like Jimmy, or have
SOUTHIE stamped on their birth certificates." He went on to suggest that the SBBT was
a "phantom" Trust set up so that a chosen few could dole out the money just like the old
days of ward bosses in South Boston.5 SBBT Chair Maryann McLeod Crush sent a letter
to the Herald suggesting that "one of Southie's own" was trying to undermine the good
work of the SBBT and its mission to provide opportunities for residents of South Boston.
In her letter, she took exception to the term "Phantom Trust" used by Gelzinis.
I am not in a position to determine who is correct in this debate, since during the course
of my research, it has been very difficult getting any information regarding the SBBT.
According to the MOU of March 11, 1998, the SBBT was to be set up as a charitable
organization pursuant to Massachusetts General Laws c. 180 and Section 501c(3) of the
Internal Revenue Code. As late as July 12, 1999, the Massachusetts Attorney Generals
office has no record of the South Boston Betterment Trust, even though they appear to be
negotiating with developers regarding housing creation. When I called Councilor Kelly's
office to get clarification, I was told by his staff person that "they can not give out any
information on the SBBT." Several weeks worth of calls and emails to SBBT Chair
Maryann McLeod Crush have resulted in more mystery. Perhaps Peter Gelzinis was
harsh in calling the SBBT a phantom Trust, but it appears he wasn't entirely incorrect.
Several of the people I interviewed, both inside and outside of City Hall, did not believe
linkage was "public" money, and therefore, the SBBT has no obligation to provide
information to the general public. Others, myself included, believe that anytime money is
collected for a public good (i.e. linkage money for affordable housing), it is public money
and must follow all of the pertinent rules and regulations.
Although it is difficult to get information directly from the SBBT, a review of recent
newspaper and internet articles gives a good indication of what the newly formed Trust
' Gelzinis, Peter. Boston Herald. April 13, 1999.
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will be spending their time on. On June 9, 1999, the Boston Globe reported that Mayor
Tom Menino and South Boston City leaders were proposing to close the South Boston
High School and build a new one in Dorchester. Southie leaders proposed turning the
High School over to the SBBT for renovations into affordable housing for seniors.
Commenting on how few South Boston youths attend the high school under the current
assignment plan, Council President Kelly suggested that if it wasn't going to be South
Boston's school, it should not be located in South Boston.6 South Boston State
Representative Jack Hart echoed Kelly's comments by suggesting that the school had
become a symbol of trouble rather than tradition, and outlined a plan for the old high
school to be delegated to the South Boston Betterment Trust for conversion into
affordable housing for seniors.7
Seven months earlier, Harborlights developer Don Law pledged an unsolicited $1 million
over ten years to South Boston's newly formed South Boston Harbor Academy Charter
school. State Senator Stephan Lynch was a founder of the school and is a current board
member. Law also pledged donations to local parochial schools, one of Councilor
Kelly's favorite causes.8
Based on these unrelated news events, it appears that one of the goals for the SBBT will
be to use linkage money to enhance the "neighborhood" schools, unless of course one of
those schools houses children from other neighborhoods, is in need of repair, and can be
replaced with affordable housing for people from the South Boston community.
The SBBT has also been very active negotiating community benefits with the developers
of Fan Pier. Hyatt Development Corporation (the Pritzker family) has been trying to
develop Fan Pier since 1987, with the latest attempt abandoned last year after the Menino
administration withdrew its support due to community pressure. In an effort to finally
win over the South Boston community, Hyatt hired local developer Spaulding and Slye to
negotiate community benefits. According to a June 2, 1999 article in the Wall Street
6 Flint, Anthony. Boston Globe. June 9, 1999.
7 Ibid.
Journal, the development team conducted hundreds of meetings trying to absorb the
demands of the community, politicians and environmental advocates. 9 Many community
benefits have already been negotiated including: a Boston Police Memorial for City
Councilor Roache, a Cardinal Cushing Memorial for State Senator Lynch, a public plaza
for U.S. Congressman Joe Moakley, and a water shuttle from Fan Pier to the Kennedy
Museum for U.S. Senator Ted Kennedy. In addition, Fan Pier developers are promising
to provide space for South Boston retailers in their buildings at the request of Councilor
Davis-Mullen, and fishing pole rentals for South Boston residents.1" There will
undoubtedly be more of these agreements made as the Fan Pier project nears the DIP
approval stage with the BRA.
The most interesting negotiations between Fan Pier developers and South Boston
community leaders appear to be in the area of housing creation. Councilor Kelly wants
Hyatt to invest in "a substantial amount of housing" in the neighborhood and sell it below
market prices. Kelly thinks this will be possible because the SBBT will acquire the land
and donate it to Hyatt to keep the company's costs down. According to Kelly, they are
talking about more than 100 units of affordable housing (more than twice as much as the
Home Again program will produce in two years), but are not revealing any of the
information publicly. Apparently, no one in City Hall, including BRA Director O'Brien,
has any idea what is happening in the negotiations between the SBBT and the
developers."
On May 24, 1999, the Hyatt development team made a presentation to residents at the
Tynan school in South Boston. The developers presented the Fan Pier project as an
opportunity for the SBBT to get "off and running in creating below-market rate housing
for long-time South Boston residents threatened with displacement." Not missing a step
in impressing the audience, the developer acknowledged the SBBT as the vehicle to
"ensure that South Boston remains a vibrant neighborhood community providing
8 Cassidy, Tina. Boston Globe. April 19, 1998.
9 O'Donnell Anand, Geeta. The Wall Street Journal. June 2, 1999.
'o Ibid.
" Ibid.
opportunities for home ownership." Dan O'Connell, from Spaulding and Slye,
acknowledged that he had met twice with the SBBT and had "made a commitment in
writing to get some affordable housing built now." 12
Modified "Legal" SBBT Linkage Process Typical "Simplified" Linkage Process
Figure 4-2
Based on these public statements made by the developers and South Boston leaders, it is
clear that they have no intention of going through the standard linkage route with money
flowing through the NHT (Figure 4-2). Assuming that the South Boston leadership has
figured out or will soon figure out that they cannot legally receive housing contribution
grants without going through the NHT, they must therefore be considering using the
housing creation option. The unusual thing about the way negotiations appear to be
taking place is that the BRA is uninvolved. As mentioned earlier, housing creation is an
option run under the rules and regulations of the BRA, and can only be approved by that
agency. My conclusion is that the SBBT is attempting to "customize" the linkage
12 Dwyer, Kevin. www.Southboston online.com.
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process in order to better serve its needs (Figure 4-2). In this customized model, the
SBBT negotiates directly with developers over housing creation opportunities. It will be
very careful about putting together projects where the developer is determining who will
live in the affordable housing in an attempt to keep it entirely for existing South Boston
residents. After a deal is documented in writing, the developer will approach the BRA
with a request for using the housing creation option in lieu of the housing contribution
grant. Of course the BRA will approve the deal because it has a signed agreement with
South Boston leaders.
The flaw in the SBBT plan is that building affordable housing in the City of Boston,
especially using linkage money, requires the use of Federal Fair Housing guidelines.
Any affordable units made available in South Boston will have to be advertised
throughout the entire City, with tenants selected in an equitable manner. In the past, the
South Boston community has gotten around this problem by targeting most of their
affordable housing to Senior Citizens, who tend to stay in neighborhoods in which they
are familiar. At some point, James Kelly and the SBBT are going to have to build
housing for more than just seniors, and that is when the discussions will get interesting.
The other role the SBBT seems to be playing is urban designer for the City of Boston.
As part of the March 11, 1998 MOU, South Boston leaders convinced the BRA to hold
building heights in the Seaport to 150 feet, with the opportunity to negotiate additional
height with the impacted community. Since the MOU also defined South Boston as the
impacted community, Southies would gain the most from increasing building heights in
the Seaport.
The developers of Fan Pier are currently negotiating with the SBBT, exchanging
community benefits for additional building height as though a city-wide process for
envisioning the new Seaport neighborhood had never taken place. Not only is this
process unfair to the citizens of Boston who helped pay for over $7.35 billion in
infrastructure in the Seaport, it is unfair to South Boston's own residents in the Fort Point
Channel neighborhood. At the Tynan School presentation, the Fan Pier developers
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ilsplayea a pnoto image or tme iuture SKyline as
viewed from the Upper End of South Boston
(Figure 4-3). The significance of the photo is
that it clearly shows where the power is in South
Boston, since the Fort Point Channel
neighborhood, which will be living in the
shadows of these office towers, is not involved in
Figure 4-3:Future Fan Pier Skyline the negotiations.
Source: www.southbostononline.com
Summary
There is a good reason for James Kelly to trust the SBBT as the mechanism for bringing
linkage money home to South Boston. He invented it, he influenced the selection of its
Trustees, and he appears to be closely involved with the negotiations it conducts and
decisions it makes.
The SBBT has the potential to act as a unified voice for the community at a time when
South Boston will be dramatically impacted by Seaport development. Unfortunately, the
Trust does not appear to be truly "representative" of South Boston, and runs the risk of
tearing the community apart instead of holding it together, which ironically was the
original goal of the linkage program.
Because of South Boston's long-standing mistrust of outsiders, the SBBT has been
operating in a semi-secret mode, creatively negotiating closed-door deals with developers
in the hope that the deals will not face the public regulations and scrutiny that other
linkage awards in other neighborhoods routinely face. When a group of 15 people are
given the opportunity to negotiate the design parameters for 1,000 acres of the city, and
will be spending millions of dollars in taxpayer money, the larger community deserves to
know who they are, where they meet, and how they make their decisions.
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Chapter Five: Summary and Recommendations
Summary
After reviewing the history of South Boston, the history, legality and process of linkage,
the NHT I and NHT II, the SBBT, and the planning process in the South Boston Seaport,
the key issues can be summarized into the three P's: Power, Planning, and Purpose. In
my summation, I will discuss how the decentralization of power within the Menino
Administration at the very time South Boston leaders are centralizing power within their
community has compromised the planning of the South Boston Seaport district. As the
SBBT steps into the void left by City Hall, exchanging community benefits for zoning
restrictions, the original purpose of linkage is subverted, leaving Boston's linkage
program vulnerable to a legal challenge.
Power
Boston has a long history of vocal neighborhoods that demand their fair share when
impacted by development. There is an equally long history, going back to the $20,000
offered to the residents of Dorchester Neck in 1803, of the City negotiating with cash.
When Mayor John F. Collins and BRA Director Ed Logue were in charge during the
early 1960's, they had access to a seemingly endless supply of Federal money because of
Logue's connections to bureaucrats in the Urban Renewal Program. At one community
meeting, someone questioned if Ed Logue had a large enough budget to follow through
on his promises to the local neighborhood. In response, Logue said that if he ran out of
money, he would "take his wheelbarrow to Washington D.C. and get more".'
'O'Malley, Tom. Boston Redevelopment Authority. Interview, June 9, 1999.
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The important lesson from the Collins/Logue era is not only the amount of money they
had, but equally significant, how they used it to centralize power within City Hall. Ed
Logue came to Boston in 1959 to help newly elected Mayor Collins build Boston's urban
renewal program. The first thing he did was to reorganize the two-year old BRA, which
was the real estate arm of the city, and the Planning Board, into one organization. As
Development Administrator, Logue used his political skills to build the new BRA into the
city's largest and most influential agency. Though his staff reached over 500 in number,
Logue kept control of the decision making process in the BRA, while forming
partnerships with the neighborhoods.2 If a neighborhood did not have a committee of
people representing the interests of the community, the BRA would help set one up with
the idea that it would not hold a public hearing on a rehabilitation plan unless the
neighborhood committee had given its formal approval.3
Through the new BRA structure, Logue had managed to centralize an enormous amount
of power. In The Rehabilitation Planning Game, Langley Keyes rationalized the
importance of centralizing power in the Development Administrator's office in order to
give it back to people in the neighborhoods. By working closely with the BRA, each
neighborhood would have the ability to shape the plan for their area. In an interview with
Keyes, Ed Logue said, "I don't think the people of West Roxbury have any right to decide
what goes on in the South End. That is for the people of the South End to decide." ,4
If Ed Logue were still in charge of the BRA, he might think the South Boston Betterment
Trust was a good vehicle for garnering South Boston's support for the development of the
Seaport (assuming the SBBT represented all of the critical interest groups in the South
Boston community, which it does not). Logue might also have used linkage money as a
negotiating tool with the SBBT. If the SBBT wanted its share of linkage money, it would
be accountable to him, and play by his rules.
2 Keyes, Langley Carleton, Jr. The Rehabilitation Planning Game: A Study in the Diversity of




Mayor Flynn and BRA Director Steve Coyle did not have Federal Urban Renewal money
to negotiate with in 1984, so they found the next best thing, which was the newly formed
linkage program. By filling the NHT I with City Hall insiders, the BRA was able to
control the activities of the Trust, making linkage a viable negotiating tool for the Mayor.
As an example, Steve Coyle ran into community resistance over his plans to close out the
Urban Renewal Program in the South End in the late 1980's. He was able to negotiate
his way out by agreeing to 70 percent affordable housing and backing it up by offering
linkage contributions as incentives for developers to build that housing. When the BRA
figured out that it had committed money at a faster rate than it was coming in to the NHT,
it had the ability and the power to craft a creative linkage securitization process to receive
the linkage payments faster and fulfill its commitments to the South End neighborhoods. 5
In retrospect, the problem with the NHT I era of Flynn/Coyle was that the BRA
controlled the linkage process, but did not "manage" its execution, causing all of the
organizational, accounting and managerial problems described earlier. After Mayor
Menino took office and the internal linkage report was completed, there was a change in
the management of the linkage program, with the Treasury Department taking overall
management responsibility and the DND taking on the Administering Agency role for the
NHT. In an effort to fix the management problems, it appears that the Mayor reduced the
BRA's role, eliminating his control mechanism for linkage. In addition, at Mayor
Menino's direction, the NHT II Trustees were selected in 1996 based on their broad-
based community representation instead of their affiliations with City Hall, creating the
most diverse and independent Trust since the inception of linkage in Boston.
The transition from NHT I to NHT II marked a radical change in the Mayor's ability to
negotiate with the neighborhoods, with the decentralization of the NHT II taking away
one of his best negotiating tools. Ironically, just as Mayor Menino was relinquishing
some of his negotiating power to the neighborhoods, one of the most important
bargaining opportunities in the history of development in Boston was taking shape in the
5 Poston, Paul R. Context and Strategy for Local Housing Initiatives: The Boston Linkage Program. MIT
Thesis. 1991. P. 53.
new South Boston Seaport, as the South Boston community gained impressive
negotiating leverage around the proposal for a new Convention Center.
After decades of being the most prolific voters in the city, the big payoff for South
Boston came on March 11, 1998 when its own Jimmy Kelly, City Council President, was
in a position to stop Mayor Menino from realizing his dream of a new Convention Center
in the South Boston Seaport District. Considering its long history of feeling taken
advantage of by the City of Boston, South Boston's leaders were strategizing for much
more than the location of a Convention Center, they were negotiating for the respect and
independence they felt was long overdue.
Mayor Menino and BRA Director Tom O'Brien instinctively did what the Flynn
administration had done before them: to use linkage as a bargaining tool. O'Brien
negotiated a deal using the $60 million in projected linkage money from the future
development of the Seaport district, not once consulting with the newly formed
"independent" NHT. Perhaps in anticipation of the NHT resistance to the deal, or as
another form of expressing Southie's independence, the MOU provided for a new "South
Boston Betterment Trust" to negotiate and receive additional "community benefits." By
restricting building heights in the new Seaport to 150 feet and designating them as
"Planned Development Areas", the BRA gave the SBBT another negotiating tool,
effectively turning the planning of the Seaport over to South Boston.
Planning
One result of Mayor Menino's decentralization of power in the City is that
neighborhoods become mini planning agencies, negotiating with developers over the
parameters of every project. To enhance the neighborhood's negotiating ability, the City
routinely under-zones and then looks the other way as "community benefits" become the
center of the negotiation game. Of course, it is not a fair game, because developers are
skilled negotiators with a keen awareness of their bottom line and an eye toward their
long term goal, while the neighborhoods are blinded by the short term allure of linkage.6
South Boston is not the only community in which this is occurring, but with 1,000 acres
of land available for development, it is certainly the most obvious.
After the release of the much maligned South Boston Seaport Master Plan interim report
in November of 1997, the BRA spent 15 months soliciting opinions and ideas for the new
Seaport district. The entire city got involved, with organizations like the American
Institute of Architects and the Seaport Alliance for a Neighborhood Design spending
considerable time designing optional schemes, and advocacy groups outlining their
concerns over the future of the Seaport, with building heights being one of the critical
discussion items. In February of 1999, the BRA issued the final Seaport Public Realm
Plan, a nicely rendered compilation of the combined vision for a mixed-use
neighborhood on the waterfront. Any developer of land in the Seaport should have to
read this 116 page document to get a good understanding of what will be expected of
them. In fact, they will stop at page seven and know exactly what is expected of them.
Several paragraphs describe in detail that the community of South Boston has set up the
SBBT to negotiate community benefits in exchange for relaxation of zoning
requirements.
South Boston will be determining building heights in much of the Seaport through a
mechanism called a Planned Development Area (PDA). According to the Seaport Public
Realm Plan,
"a PDA designation allows for a more comprehensive balancing of the
impacts and benefits of a project. PDAs provide for both greater
flexibility and additional controls for project development. Through the
use of a PDA designation, the City may be able to achieve, to a greater
degree, certain public policy goals for a particular area, such as more
affordable housing or public improvements." 7
This is another way of saying that building heights are negotiable if you are willing to
pay the price. PDA's might be defensible if the negotiations were being done by a
6 Kressel, Shirley. President, Boston Alliance of Neighborhoods. Interview. July 16, 1999.
7 Boston Redevelopment Authority. The Seaport Public Realm Plan. February 1999. P. 19.
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professional Planning agency with the overall interests of the city in mind.
Unfortunately, in this case, 15 months of city-wide discussion over building heights has
been reduced to closed-door meetings between the SBBT and developers. The most
obvious problem with this situation is that the SBBT is understandably looking out for its
own interests and will consequently, most likely approve development in the Seaport that
is the most rewarding from its financial point of view, regardless of what is best for the
city as a whole.
Purpose of Linkage
When it was being proposed in 1983, the purpose of linkage was to mitigate the loss of
affordable housing resulting from commercial office growth. Reluctant at first,
developers soon learned that the advantage to linkage was that the rules were known and
the deals were brought from under the table to above the table. Because Boston's linkage
program was quasi-mandatory, "under-zoning" became common practice in order to
maximize the number of projects requiring zoning relief, and hence the ability to
negotiate community benefits. This process worked effectively when the BRA tightly
controlled the negotiations. Now the neighborhoods have replaced the BRA at the
negotiation table (as exemplified in South Boston), where the rules of linkage are getting
less clear, and certainly less under the aegis of City Hall.
In 1998, the NHT approved the construction of 27 units of affordable housing throughout
the City of Boston using linkage money. When those units are completed, an open
process will allow every eligible family in the city a fair opportunity to purchase or rent
one of the units. By contrast, the SBBT is negotiating privately with developers about
hundreds of units of affordable housing, searching for creative ways to keep that housing
in the hands of Southie residents.
While abdicating its linkage negotiations to the SBBT, the City is ultimately responsible
for the decisions that get made. If at some point, the SBBT crosses the line of
appropriateness, Boston's linkage program could be challenged in Court. Given the
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City's track record with past management difficulties and poor record keeping, a legal
challenge could be problematic.
The complex strategy issue then is: how can the City restore its control of the linkage
program, fulfill its promises to the South Boston community, and still achieve the goal of
creating a vibrant mixed-use neighborhood in the South Boston Seaport district?
The tendency in trying to answer a challenge like this is to panic and think it has to be
solved before the next building rises from the earth in the Seaport district. It is important
to realize, however, that this situation, in all its complexity, is one that took hundreds of
years to develop. The residents of South Boston are not just negotiating about the
development of the Seaport district, they are negotiating about generations of not feeling
respected by the City of Boston. The linkage program has evolved for 16 years through
two administrations to get to the point it is at today, while planning in Boston is still
reacting to its failures during urban renewal in the West End.8
The good news is that it will take 30 years or more to develop the Seaport district, so
there is still time for a thoughtful, methodical approach to the three seemingly
contradictory goals. The important thing is to start now. To that end, I have outlined a
series of recommendations for Mayor Menino using the following criteria:
* Those responsible for collecting and distributing public goods should do so
with city-wide equity in mind.
* When dealing with public goods, transparency in decision making and intent
is essential.
* The complexity of Boston's linkage program requires a sophisticated and
rigorous process.
* If linkage is a form of exaction, there should be a "nexus" between where
money is collected and spent.
8 The West End urban renewal project involved the bulldozing of a vibrant neighborhood for luxury
apartments. It is commonly referred to as Boston's greatest planning disaster. Herbert Gans describes it
well in his book, The Urban Villagers (New York:Free Press;Collier Macmillan Publishers. 1982).
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* Zoning should be a serious planning tool, not simply a means for starting a
negotiation.
* Decision-making power should be centralized within City Hall before being
allocated to the neighborhoods.
* Elected officials are accountable to the voters and should exercise their policy
intentions through appointed bodies that are in turn, accountable to the elected
officials.
Recommendations
The first thing the Mayor should do is stabilize the linkage program. He can start this
process by assigning one person as the Linkage Coordinator for the City of Boston.
The Linkage Coordinator would be responsible for making sure that City staff,
developers and neighborhoods utilize the linkage process as intended by City Ordinance
and State Law. This person would ideally be in the Mayor's office, perhaps as "Special
Assistant to the Mayor for Linkage Policy." The other departments and agencies would
maintain their responsibilities such as the BRA controlling the DIP process and the DND
working with affordable housing developers. The difference is, one person would be
responsible for the smooth operation of the entire process and make sure coordination
between the departments and agencies actually happens.
The first task for the new linkage coordinator should be to address management issues
that have not been resolved since the 1996 internal report. While many
improvements have been made, there appear to be some problem areas that are still not
resolved. The Boston Municipal Research Bureau report of October 1998 appears to
have solid recommendations that could be implemented, such as developing a policy
manual clearly outlining the roles and responsibilities of all the departments and agencies
involved with the linkage process. The Bureau also recommends a process for
exchanging building permit and occupancy permit data between the BRA, Treasury
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Department and ISD, by customizing the City's computer system for the linkage
program. 9
At the same time the management issues are being addressed, the Mayor should
strategically think about the membership of the NHT. On January 1, 2000, the terms
of all five NHT Trustees expire, which has traditionally meant that the Mayor gives every
Trustee another two year term. In this case, I suggest he think very carefully about
selecting Trustees that are closely aligned with his goals for the linkage program. He
should begin staggering the terms of the NHT Trustees so there is a process for replacing
members every year while retaining institutional memory on the Trust. This
recommendation is not meant as a negative reflection on the current Trust, but recognizes
the political reality that Mayor Menino is ultimately responsible for the linkage program
during his term in office, and as such, needs to have more control over the process.
After the new Trust is in place, it should start formally recognizing the 10/20 percent
rule articulated in Article 26A of the Boston Zoning Ordinance.1" Article 26A
specifies a "minimum of 10 or 20 percent" of linkage money be allocated to the impacted
community, but does not rule out allocating a higher percentage under special
circumstances. A system should be developed for officially designating the impacted
community and earmarking linkage money for it through the 10/20 rule. This will bring
the issue of "nexus" back into the linkage picture, further solidifying the linkage program
in Boston.
Once a clear system is in place for allocating money to impacted neighborhoods through
the 10/20 rule, the Mayor should publicly announce that the 51 percent linkage
agreement as part of the MOU with South Boston is a modified version of the 10/20
rule. It was probably not a good idea to negotiate 51percent of linkage away to the
impacted community, and the Mayor will not want this to be a precedent setting event.
9 Boston Municipal Research Bureau, Inc. Boston's Linkage Program: A New Approach To Managing
Linkage Funds For Housing And Job Training. October 1998. P. 16.




Process He can attempt to justify the rationale for giving
South Boston 51 percent of the linkage money
because this is the first time this volume of
development is occurring directly in the impacted
community, not just adjacent to it. In addition, he can
argue that after the affordable housing opportunities
are exhausted in the traditional South Boston
neighborhood, the linkage money will be allocated to
affordable housing opportunities in the Seaport
transition zone creating a new vibrant mixed-income
neighborhood which will benefit the entire city.
Today, the idea of convincing South Boston leaders
Figure 5-1 that part of their linkage money will be spent in the
Seaport is unthinkable. However, in one or two
years, the first affordable housing projects will be built in South Boston, and the
politicians will learn that they cannot legally choose who will live in the units. The appeal
of the housing being built within the traditional neighborhood will be lost and they will
probably be more agreeable to units being built in the Seaport.
At this point, the mechanism will be in place for funneling 51 percent of the housing
contribution money and 100 percent of the Seaport Hotel linkage money to the South
Boston community (Figure 5-1). To get the designated money from the NHT, the
community will have to have affordable housing projects that meet the criteria set by the
Trust.
Mayor Menino should encourage the SBBT to take on the role of neighborhood
broker, working between the housing developers and the NHT, making sure the projects
fit the goals of the neighborhood and the criteria of the NHT. This is really just a
political move since the SBBT is not likely to go away after the linkage process is
refined. For the broker plan to work, Mayor Menino should encourage the SBBT to
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become more representative of the South Boston community. The SBBT will have no
incentive to listen to Mayor Menino, but he could set an example at the next annual
meeting of the Trust by using his three selections to place one person each from St.
Vincent's, Andrew Square, and the Fort Point Channel neighborhoods on the SBBT.
The biggest problem left at this point would be the SBBT still negotiating directly with
developers, exchanging zoning relief for community benefits. Somehow, Mayor Menino
has to separate planning from linkage by eliminating the "community benefits for
building heights" negotiations that are taking place between developers and the SBBT.
His biggest challenge will be replacing the loss of community benefits that South Boston
leaders negotiated so hard for in the MOU of March 11, 1998. He could start by
convincing the City Council to change some key aspects of the linkage ordinance, which
would also need to be approved by the State Legislature. These changes to the linkage
program would have city-wide benefits in addition to appeasing South Boston. They
include changing Boston's quasi-mandatory linkage program to mandatory linkage,
similar to San Francisco. The biggest benefit to mandatory linkage is that it makes
zoning a planning tool again. Instead of under-zoning the Seaport and having the SBBT
negotiate linkage for building height, the City would zone based on the city-wide input it
received during the planning process. If the public process determined that building
heights should be a maximum of 150 feet on Fan Pier, it would be written into the zoning
and changed only after further public hearings. As mentioned earlier, there are situations
where negotiable zoning is appropriate, but only when orchestrated by a professional
planning agency, not the neighborhoods.
In order to placate South Boston and other neighborhoods that rely on the community
benefits they receive by negotiating zoning, housing linkage fees should be raised to at
least $8 per square foot in February of 2001, and the exemption number should be
reduced from 100,000 to 50,000 square feet." This will increase the cost to the
developer, but should be balanced out by reducing the amount of community benefits
" The City Zoning Ordinance specifies that the linkage rate can be raised every third year with the next
date being February 1, 2001.
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they pay, once again bringing negotiations above the table. The City Zoning Ordinance
specifies that the linkage rate can be increased every third year, but despite a 76 percent
cost of living increase in Boston between 1983 and 1999, the City has chosen not to
increase the fee.12 I recommend leaving the linkage payment periods at seven and twelve
years to reduce the financial burden on the developers.
My final recommendation is for the Linkage Coordinator to set up a special steering
committee after the linkage program is running smoothly, in order to evaluate methods
for maximizing the effectiveness of the linkage program. There are already dozens of
promising ideas that have been generated by City employees over the past ten years,
including a linkage revolving loan fund, letters of credit, and a buyers assistance
program.' 3 Most of these ideas have not been implemented, and should be reviewed as
possible ways to maximize the impact of Boston's linkage program.
Conclusion
Sixteen months after the signing of the MOU, the purpose and even the legality of the
South Boston Betterment Trust remains a mystery that neither the Menino Administration
nor the South Boston leaders seem anxious to clear up or even discuss. It could be that it
is in the best interests of both camps to keep the role of the SBBT and the Seaport linkage
process a mystery for as long as possible. Two years from now, when the linkage money
starts coming in and someone from another neighborhood points out the illegalities of the
negotiated agreement, Councilor Kelly can blame Tom O'Brien for not keeping his
promises, and Mayor Menino can point to the Federal Fair Housing Regulations as the
reason he can not live up to his end of the bargain. This might get the politicians out of
hot water with their constituents, but it will only exacerbate the longstanding negative
feelings in the South Boston neighborhood. After all, the South Boston neighborhood is
12 I utilized the Consumer Price Index for Urban Wage Earners and Clerical Workers in Boston from 1983
to 1999, found on the Bureau of Labor Statistics web site.
13 These ideas and many more were outlined in an internal memo from Tom O'Malley and Tom McColgan
to BRA Director Marisa Lago on May 23, 1994.
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being impacted and there is a deal on the table that should be honored as much as
possible within the legal confines of the linkage ordinance.
I have tried to lay out a complicated issue in as clear a framework as I could muster. I do
not pretend to have all of the answers, but I do know that moving toward clarification and
re-framing of the process before it turns into a political battle is important. By taking
action sooner rather than later, as outlined in the previous recommendations, the City can
restore its control of the linkage program, protecting its viability for future generations.
In addition, it can fulfill its promises to the South Boston community while creating a








James M. Kelly, Stephen F. Lynch and John A. Hart, Jr.
This Memorandum of Understanding ("MOU") is entered into as of March 11, 1998
by and among the Boston Redevelopment Authority, James M. Kelly, Stephen F.
Lynch and John A. Hart, Jr. regarding benefits to the residents of South Boston in
connection with future development in the Seaport District, as hereinafter defined.'
WHEREAS, pursuant Chapter 152 of the Acts of 1997 entitled "An Act Relative to
the Construction and Financing of Convention and Exhibition Centers in the
Commonwealth" (the "Act"), the Massachusetts Senate and the House of Representatives
in General Court have authorized, among other things, the financing and construction of a
new convention and exhibition center in the City of Boston (the "Convention Center"); and
WHEREAS, pursuant to the Act, the Boston Redevelopment Authority ("BRA"), a
public body politic and corporate organized and existing pursuant to Chapter 121B of the
Massachusetts General Laws and Chapter 652 of the Acts of 1960, is responsible for
undertaking certain activities related to the establishment of the Convention Center,
including without limitation, the acquisition of land required as and for a site for the
Convention Center, and is further responsible for completing a master plan for zoning in
the Seaport District (the "Master Plan"); and
WHEREAS, James M. Kelly; Stephen Lynch and John Hart (the "Representatives")
are individuals residing in South Boston and are elected officials representing the citizens
thereof, and have listened to the concerns of their neighbors and constituents regarding the
impacts on South Boston of development in the Seaport District; and
WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 13(a)(1) of the Act, the Boston City Council (the
"City Council"), a public body politic and corporate organized and existing pursuant to
Chapter 452 of the Acts of 1948, must vote on or prior to March 11, 1998, on (i) whether to
approve the Convention Center project as provided in Section 4 of the Act, and as defined
in Section 2 of the Act (the "Project"), and (ii) on whether to authorize pursuant to Section
6(a) of the Act indebtedness or appropriate sums in an aggregate amoun: not exceeding
S157,800,000 for the Project; and
WHEREAS, further pursuant to Section 13(a) of the Act, neither the BRA nor the
Massachusetts Convention Center Authority (the "MhCCA") shall have the authority to
proceed with the Project without the approval of the City Council; and
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WHEREAS, the Representatives have deemed it to be in the public interest of
South Boston to have this MOU signed by the parties hereto prior to the City Council
taking the aforesaid votes; and
WHEREAS, the parties hereto acknowledge that the neighborhood of South Boston
will be most impacted by development in the Seaport District; and
WHEREAS, the parties hereto have deemed it to be in the public interest that
there shall be established a charitable organization to be known as the South Boston
Betterment Trust (the "Trust") pursuant to Massachusetts General Laws c. 180 and
Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, the directors of which shall be residents of
South Boston (including but not limited to its elected officials and other neighborhood
leaders), selected by such officials and leaders, which Trust shall, in perpetuity, be the.
beneficiary of community benefits established pursuant to this MOU or to any agreements
related to development in the Seaport District; and
WHEREAS, the BRA and the Representatives intend to cooperate and to coordinate
their joint efforts with regard to the provision of benefits for the residents of South Boston
in connection with future development in the Seaport District; and




As used in this MOU, the following terms shall have the definitions set forth below:
a) "City" means-the City of Boston.
b) "Commonwealth" means the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.
c) "Impacted Neighborhood" means South Boston.
d) "Project" shall have the meaning set forth in Section 2 of the Act.
e) "Seaport District" shall mean that portion of South Boston extending from the Fort
Point Commercial Area to Industrial Port, situated Northerly and Northeasterly of
the South Boston residential neighborhood, as more particularly described in the
Interim Report dated December, 1997, entitled "The South Boston Seaport -- a
Master Plan for the Fort Point and South Boston Waterfront -- Interim Report"
issued by the City of Boston and the Boston Redevelopment Authori:2.
f) All other terms not defined herein, but defined in the Act, shall have the meaning
set forth in the Act.
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Article 2
Employment and Job Training
2.1 Jobs Linkage. The BRA, working with the Neighborhood Jobs Trust, shall establish
an aggregate annual goal of allocating no less than a majority of job linkage deriving
from development within the Seaport District pursuant to Article 26B ot the Boston
Zoning Code, as a community benefit to residents of the Impacted Neighborhood,
with the intention that such job linkage promote the job training and employment
for residents of the Impacted Neighborhood and provide employment-related
education scholarships for students from such Impacted Neighborhood.
2.2 Annual Linkage Monitor. A designee of the Mayor of the City from either the
Neighborhood Housing Trust or the Neighborhood Jobs Trust, -the Director of the
BRA, a designee of the City Councilor of the district encompassing the Impacted
Neighborhood (which designee shall be a resident of the Impacted Neighborhood),
and the State Senator, State Representative and City Councilor representing the
Impacted Neighborhood, shall meet once annually to monitor the progress of-
achieving the goals set forth in Sections- 2. 1 and 3.1 herein and the administration
of linkage deriving therefrom.
Article 3
Housing
3.1 Housing Linkage. The BRA, working with the Neighborhood Housing Trust, shall
establish an annual aggregate.goal of allocating no less than a majority of housing
linkagederiving fror development within theSeaport District pursuanto Article
26A of the oston Zoning Code, as a community benefit -to residents of the Impacted
Neighborhood, for the purposes of developing affordable housing in the Impacted
Neighborhood and assisting senior citizens, first time homebuyers and others who
are residents therein `tith their housing needs.
3.2 Affordable Housing Sites. Within one hundred and eighty (180) days hereof, the
BRA shall identify parcels of land available in South Boston for the development of
affordable single and multi-family housing.
3.3 Encouragement of Site Purchases. The BRA shall use its best efforts, through
cooperation agreements or otherwise, to include as a compone n community
benefits deriving from the Seaport District development a requirement that sites in
the Impacted Neighborhood be purchased by the developer on behalf of the Trust for




4.1 Height Limitation. The BRA shall petition the Boston Zoning Commission to
establish in the Seaport District a maximum as-of-right building height of one
hundred fifty (150) feet. The BRA shall include a height limitation of no more than
one hundred fifty (150) feet in its final Master Plan for Seaport District zoning, to
ensure the residents of the Impacted Neighborhood that no developer (including,
without limitation, the MCCA) may construct a building in the Seaport District in
excess of one hundred and fifty (150) feet in height without such developer first (i)
completing in the Impacted Neighborhood a public community review process; (ii)
executing a written agreement obligating said developer to deliver certain benefits
to the Impacted Neighborhood as discussed during the community review process;
and (iii) either filing a Development Area development plan or master plan with and
acceptable to the BRA (if such plan is required pursuant to Article 80 of the Boston
Zoning Code or the Seaport District Master Plan, in which case the aforesaid
benefits agreement shall be incorporated therein), or obtaining a variance or a
conditional use permit from the City of Boston Board -of Appeal which shall
incorporate the aforesaid .benefits agreement.
4.2 IPOD Extension. The BRA shall petition the Boston Zoning Commission to extend,
as necessary, the new IPOD which affects, among other land, the land upon which
the Convention Center is proposed to be built, and the surrounding buffer zone, so
that such IPOD is effective until the Seaport District Master Plan takes effect; the
Seaport District Master Plan shall, among other things, make permanent the said
buffer zone.
4.3 Dorchester Avenue. The BRA shall use its best efforts to encourage the United
States Postal Service to make Dorchester Avenue a public way.
4.4 Ongoing Traffic and Environmental Review. The BRA shall keep the
Representatives apprised of the status and results of all traffic and environmental
review of development projects in the Seaport District.
Article 5
Miscellaneous
5.1 MASSPORT. The Massachusetts Port Authority ("LMASSPORT") hereby
acknowledges that it is completing a Memorandum of Understanding with the BRA
(the "MASSPORT/BRIA NIOU") whereby with respect to Seaport Dis:rict
Development, MASSPORT wvill complete a community and a BRA r-eiew process
similar to that set forth in Article SO of the Boston Zoning Code, as -ore
particularly set forth in the MASSPORT: BRA MOU, and will keep :?e residents of
the Impacted Neighborhood informed of MIASSPORT's prospective 6development
plans by holding no fewer than two public meetings annually in the Impacted
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Neighborhood, all as evidenced by the letter from MASSPORT, which is attached
hereto as Exhibit A incorporated herein.
5.2 Binding Effect. This MOU is a legally binding document having the full force and
effect of the law between the parties and their successors in office, assignees and
agents, and shall be enforceable by the signatories hereto in a court of law by
equitable relief, but shall create no rights hereunder in any party not a signatory
hereto.
5.3 Applicable Law. This MOU shall be interpreted in accordance with the laws of the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts.
5.4 Captions. The captions to the various Articles and Sections hereof have been
inserted in this MOU for convenience only and shall not affect the meaning of the
language therein.
5.5 Entire Agreement. This MOU sets forth the entire agreement of the parties hereto
with respect to the subject matter contained herein, and no amendment of this
MOU shall be effective unless it is in writing and signed by the parties to this MOU.
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, on this I 1"' day of March, 1998, the Director of the




irfiel M.,Kelly, in his dapacit 'as District City Councilor, District 2
,Stephen 'F. Lynch, irihis capacity as State Senator, I' Suffolk District
Joh ,A. Hart, JU#n his capacity as State Representative, 4h Suffolk District
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